Opening Remarks

Opening Remarks

Mr. Katsuyuki Kawai, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Japan

The honorable guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning.
First of all, I would like to extend my warmest welcome to all of you from all over the world here today. Today, I am very glad that the Tokyo Seminar on G8 Global Partnership is jointly held by the Japan-Russia Committee for Cooperation on Reducing Nuclear Weapons and the CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies. On the occasion of the opening of this Seminar, I would like to make some brief remarks on behalf of the Japanese government, as I am responsible for disarmament, non-proliferation and scientific affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Ladies and gentlemen,
The G8 Global Partnership was launched in the year 2002 at the G8 Summit held in Kananaskis in Canada. The G8 Global Partnership is to implement the projects in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism as well as nuclear security, including the environmental issues. The G8 countries are to work in collaboration for these projects. Ever since then, we have seen steadfast achievements and results overcoming various difficulties through the international cooperation. We were able to see some of the countries to participate apart from the G8 countries. We have seen successful completion of the dismantlement of the first nuclear submarine through the Japan-Russia cooperation in the Far East.

I myself originally come from Hiroshima. Before being a politician, as a Japanese citizen, as a citizen of Hiroshima, I have always held a strong interest over the nuclear issue. Japan is a non-nuclear weapon country. Through the new framework of the Global Partnership, I believe it is meaningful that we are able to contribute to the reduction of nuclear weapons from a broad sense of the term.

Countries, which were confronting each other divided into two blocks, East and West, are coming together to remove the negative legacy. I believe it is, indeed, a symbolic endeavor leading to possibilities of new international cooperation after the end of the Cold War.

The Global Partnership is a loose framework of cooperation, not a rigid legal arrangement, which follows through a certain set of policies and guidelines. The methodology of the Global Partnership could be applicable in broadly different areas, involving various countries, so I believe this has a great potential for the future.

Now, in order to make this new endeavor a successful one, we need to have an active participation by the partner countries by providing the significant amount of funding in view of the relevance of their importance. It is, indeed, absolutely necessary that the governments have the support of the civil society in order to tackle with all these issues in a sustainable manner. One of the purposes of this seminar is to promote the understanding of the civil society. In this regard, it is fortunate that we are able to have Senator Sam Nunn, who is the founding father of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) projects, the precursor to the G8 Global Partnership, and is still very active as an advocate of the Partnership on the side of civil society. I would like to welcome and express my appreciation to the participation of Senator Sam Nunn. Ever since my student days, I have always had the great respect and admiration for Senator Nunn. I would like to personally express my gratitude for his kind participation to this seminar.

In Japan, we have many parliamentarians having strong interest over this issue. In order to promote the project for dismantling decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines in Far East Russia, we have established the Parliamentarians League to promote the Japan-Russia cooperation for Russian denuclearization. This is a symbolic project for the cooperation between Japan and Russia, and Prime Minister Koizumi has named this project "The Star of Hope". The project was named after Zvezda, the shipyard, meaning "star" in Russian language. Zvezda Shipyard is the site for the dismantling of the nuclear submarines. The Parliamentarians League is also nicknamed "The Star of Hope" Parliamentarians League.

The other important purpose for holding the seminar today is to enhance the interest of the international community over the projects in Far East Russia. There are 30 or so decommissioned nuclear submarines being moored in the Russian Far East, but the United States and Japan are the only countries, which have been committed to dismantling in the Far East. So, compared to northwestern Russia, we are lagging behind. We hope that we will be able to share the experiences in northwestern Russia to be applied to the Russian Far East as we do have many participants from Europe to the seminar. I believe the gleam of hope is beginning to shine in the Russian Far East as well, because last year Australia and the Republic of Korea have decided to participate in the G8 Global Partnership. In particular, I have high appreciation for Australia, who made the contribution to the Japan-Russia Committee to assist the destruction of nuclear weapons reduced in the Russian Federation last year.

In order to proceed with the G8 Global Partnership, it is indeed critical to see Russia exercising its role and responsibility. We are indeed privileged to have Mr. Antipov, who is the Russian representative to the governing counsel of the bilateral committee and the Deputy Director of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the many representatives from Russia, from Moscow, and from Vladivostok. Mr. Antipov is the person responsible for the dismantling of the nuclear submarines as well as other nuclear weapons. I am looking forward to the meaningful discussion with active input from the Russian government and explanation on situations of the site. I, myself, would like to visit the Zvezda Shipyard, in the middle of July to see with my own eyes the progress.

It has been three years since the last Kananaskis summit was held. In order to accelerate the process of the Global Partnership, there are many issues that need to be overcome. But the light of "The Star of Hope" seems to be shining and I very much hope that it will continue to shine above many countries and the people in order to bring peace and prosperity to all of us.

I very much hope that we will be able to see great achievements during the seminar. I thank you very much for your attention.

Keynote Speech

"The Race Between Cooperation and Catastrophe"

Senator Sam Nunn, Former U.S. Senator, Co-Chairman and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Chairman of Board of Trustees of CSIS

Parliamentary Secretary, Mr. Kawai, I like very much your symbolism of The Star of Hope and I think that this seminar has a real opportunity to make that star shine much brighter for the people of Japan, for the people of Russia, United States and all the participating countries and I, too, want to thank the countries—Australia, particularly, and South Korea—for joining this effort. There are many countries that are not in the G8 now that have now vigorously joined in the Global Partnership, which I think is a tremendous and encouraging sign.

So, this morning, I want to thank Mr. Ogasawara for the introduction and for helping host this conference. I also want to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and, particularly the Japan Institute of International Affairs, one of our key partners in this non-governmental partnership that is doing everything possible to stimulate the success of the G8 Global Partnership. I also would like to thank the Japan-Russia committee; all of these organizations have helped in organizing and hosting this conference.

I am honored to have the opportunity this morning to be in Japan to talk about what we all must do together to make a safer world. I am here today—and I have stayed involved in public policy following my career in the Senate—because I believe that the gravest danger in the world today is the threat of weapons of mass destruction. And I also believe that the most likely use of those weapons of mass destruction would be in the hands of terrorists so I believe that all of us in every nation must prevent this danger and we can only do so if every country accepts that this is the number one threat, and if every country makes it a priority to cooperate for our common security.

As I view it, we are in a dangerous period of history with great opportunity but also great peril, where the threats have changed quickly, and our responses have changed very slowly—far too slowly. Throughout most of history, great nations have trusted other nations often as little as possible. They believed they could guarantee and assure their own security, but today, with the rise of global terrorism, with poorly-secured nuclear weapons in too many places around the globe, weapons and materials—particularly materials—and when our economy is so tightly intertwined and dependent on trade, it is possible that a small group of terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons or material in one nation, launch a nuclear attack in another nation and stagger the security and the economy of all nations. This gives every nation a common interest and a common duty to do their part to defend the world against a terrorist nuclear attack. No single nation, or group of nations, can prevent weapons of mass destruction terrorism on their own. We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe, and the threats are outrunning our response.

Here in Japan, you have known since March 20, 1995—about ten years ago this spring—that a terrorist group would be willing to use chemical weapons to try to kill thousands of civilians. Some in the United States dismissed this attack when the news first came out, this attack by Aum Shinrikyo as an isolated event that would never recur and affected no one outside Japan. I did not agree. The same year it happened, I launched a Senate investigation to understand what this Tokyo attack meant for national and global security. The Government of Japan in 1995 and 1996 provided superb assistance to my investigative committee. We learned from that investigation that Aum Shinrikyo had more

than a billion dollars in assets; they wrote publicly about their desire to kill many people; they produced chemical agents such as sarin and VX gas; they tried to build a plant to develop biological weapons, even sent an expedition to Africa to try to acquire the Ebola virus; they attempted to recruit scientists and technical experts in Japan, in Russia and elsewhere to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States made it clear that other groups are also grave dangers. The 9/11 Commission in the United States has reported that Osama bin Laden has been working for over ten years to try to acquire weapons of mass destruction. So, with so much at stake, our citizens have every reason to ask policymakers: "Are we doing all we can to prevent a nuclear attack?" My emphatic answer is "No, we are not."

Increasingly, we are being warned that an act of nuclear terrorism is inevitable. I do not concede that point. But I do believe that unless we greatly elevate our effort and the speed of our response, we could face a disaster that would have a profound and devastating effect, not only on the immediate victims but also on the world economy and the confidence of the world required to make our economies work.

Let me explain this morning my own sense of urgency by describing four nuclear-related threats we face today. The first scenario I would like to pose in a fictional but all too realistic manner is a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon. Let us imagine this morning the following scenario:

Under cover of darkness, terrorists slip into a lightly-guarded nuclear research reactor. Assisted by insiders, they take fifty kilograms of highly enriched uranium and head for a safe house that is equipped with machine tools, chemicals, bomb designs—everything necessary to turn a terrorist group into a nuclear power.

A few days later, intelligence agents discover the safe house, where they find machine tools with traces of highly enriched uranium—but no bomb. The combined security forces of many governments around the world deploy to guard hundreds of ports and airports and thousands of miles of coastline. Yet the bomb moves through a border crossing, undetected by radiation sensors because it is shielded by a thin layer of lead. At midday in a city of several million people, the world suffers its first nuclear strike in sixty years. The day after, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?

I believe we would wish that the world's top security priority had been a global effort based on best practices to upgrade the security of all nuclear weapons and all weapons-usable materials and to promote a culture of security at all our facilities. I believe we would wish that we had contributed more to the IAEA nuclear security fund to lock down nuclear weapons and materials in every country and in every facility that has them. I believe we would wish that the G8's Global Partnership had more quickly turned its pledges into programs and directed its resources aggressively against the most urgent dangers as it committed to do almost three years ago at its meeting in Kananaskis, Canada. I believe we would wish that we had moved faster to implement the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to remove and secure nuclear weapons materials from research facilities around the world. We would wish that we had established a global norm, minimizing and wherever possible, converting existing research reactors to operate on low-enriched uranium fuel, thereby greatly reducing the wide distribution of bomb-making materials spread through the world. And I believe we would wish that the United States and Russia had insisted and agreed on bilateral transparent accountability of tactical nuclear weapons in both the United States and Russian arsenals on a reciprocal basis. The day after, I believe we would wish we had done all those things and my question this morning is why aren't we doing them now?

Let us take threat number two, scenario number two: a terrorist attack with a "dirty" bomb. Let us imagine the following scenario: A terrorist group with insider help acquires a dangerous quantity of ce-

sium-137 from a medical facility. The terrorists use conventional explosives to incorporate the powdered chloride cesium into a "dirty bomb," and detonate it in the financial district of Tokyo or Beijing or Moscow or New York, dispersing cesium isotope across a 60-square block area. The explosion kills a dozen or so people but millions evacuate the city in panic. Billions of dollars of real estate is declared uninhabitable. Cleanup is estimated to take years and cost additional billions.

The day after a dirty bomb attack, what would we wish we had done to prevent it and to mitigate the damage if, God forbid, it does ever occur? I believe we would wish that we had worked harder to develop a risk-based global inventory of vulnerable radioactive sources and better prioritized our efforts to secure them through a partnership effort around the globe. I believe we would wish we had worked harder to secure radioactive sources at every stage of their lifecycle, from their production through their shipment, their use and disposal, what I call a cradle to grave approach to dangerous nuclear materials all over the globe.

And I believe that we would wish that we had ensured that first responders had plans, protective gear and decontamination equipment in place to respond to such an attack, and that we had mounted a serious public education and training program to mitigate the panic and the consequences of that type of attack. The day after, I believe we would wish that we had done all of these things and my question to all of us this morning is why aren't we doing them now?

Let us take scenario number three: A sharp increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. Imagine the following scenario and, unfortunately, it is not at all difficult to imagine: North Korea continues to turn its spent nuclear fuel into bomb-grade plutonium and manufacture nuclear weapons, and then suddenly tests a weapon, as India and Pakistan did in 1998. Iran continues to play a cat and mouse game until it has developed enough highly-enriched uranium to build several nuclear weapons. As Iran and North Korea become nuclear states, other nations around the globe reexamine their options. Before a decade passes, five other nations have become nuclear powers, provoking greater regional tensions, greater pressure on other nations to go nuclear, greater chance of nuclear accidents and greater danger that weapons or materials could fall into terrorist hands. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty becomes a mere artifact of history. After this occurs, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?

I believe that we would wish that the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia and other nations had formed an effective strategy involving real incentives to get North Korea to give up its nuclear program but also agreement on strong penalties if the North Korean regime remains on its present course. I believe we would wish that the international community had acted more vigorously to dissuade Iran from acquiring a uranium enrichment capability and that our negotiating strategy had included a much more effective blend of agreed on cooked carrots and much sharper sticks. I believe we would wish that we had developed a new international arrangement to discourage the spread of enrichment and other fuel-cycle capabilities under national control, including a consortium of nuclear suppliers who would guarantee nuclear fuel at fair and favorable market rates to other states, thereby removing any pretext for new states to develop fuel-cycle capabilities of their own. And I believe we would wish that the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States and Russia, had set an example of devaluing rather than enhancing the importance of nuclear weapons at a time when we were asking others to renounce nuclear weapons. As Director General El Baradei has said, it's hard to tell people not to smoke when you have a cigarette dangling from your own mouth. In this respect, we would wish that the United States and Russia had followed up on the Treaty of Moscow with other substantive actions by adding benchmarks for progress, mechanisms for verification, timetables for reductions and a mutual pledge to eliminate warheads and not just eliminate delivery mechanisms. I also believe coming from the United States that we would wish that the United States

had moved forward with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and worked for its ratification in the Senate.

The day after we wake up and discover several new nations with their fingers on the nuclear trigger, and dramatically increased opportunities for terrorists to gain nuclear materials, I believe we would wish we had done all of these things and my question for us this morning is why aren't we doing them now?

My fourth and final scenario this morning, an accidental or unauthorized nuclear missile strike. Let us imagine this scenario. The relationship between Russia and the United States deteriorates in the future. Old rivalries and suspicions are rekindled, and as tension mounts, President Putin is informed by the head of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces that their warning systems have picked up the signature of the launch of a single United States nuclear missile heading toward Moscow. President Putin would probably ask if the system could be sending a false warning. He would be told: "Yes, the warning could be false." He would ask if there was one missile or could there be more. He would be told that the Russian warning systems, the radars and the satellites have badly eroded in recent years so it appears to be only one missile, but it could be a much larger attack. He would ask, "Is it possible that an all-out attack could destroy all of our missiles and take away our ability to retaliate?" He would be told, "Yes, it is possible." He would ask, "How much time do I have before I have to decide whether to launch our nuclear missiles or lose them?" He would be told, "Approximately thirty minutes at most." This scenario could result in a mistaken, accidental or unauthorized nuclear missile strike. The day after, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?

I believe that the United States and Russia would wish that we had changed our Cold War force postures and removed most of our nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, so that both leaders would have more time to gather data, more time to exchange information, more time to gain perspective, more time to discover an error and more time to avoid an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized nuclear launch. I also believe the United States and Russia would wish that we had recognized that our very survival depends on the accuracy of each other's warning systems and that we would wish we had followed through on the 1998 initiative that we agreed on but never implemented to develop a joint early warning center to prevent false warnings and greatly reduce the danger of a catastrophic mistake.

The day after, I believe that we would wish that we had done all of these things and more. My question this morning, again, is why aren't we doing these things now?

Now, I do not want to suggest this morning that we are doing nothing to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Important steps have been taken. Let me list just a few: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which has been working since 1991 to secure and destroy weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. This program, although it didn't get noticed much around the world, one of our most notable achievements was to help Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus get rid of all their nuclear weapons, an historic achievement that both the United States and Russia worked diligently to accomplish and great credit goes to these three countries for giving up their nuclear arsenals.

The United States and Russia have announced a Global Threat Reduction Initiative and we are now working to remove and secure highly enriched uranium from research facilities around the globe, but that has just started and it has a long way to go. There are over 40 countries around the globe that have enough nuclear material to make a nuclear weapon and much of that material is not properly secured.

At the US-Russian summit earlier this year, Presidents Bush and Putin each made a personal commitment, which was announced after the summit, to enhance and accelerate efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials worldwide. A very impor-

tant commitment again, if implemented.

The G8 committed three years ago to create and provide $20 billion to fund the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, a solid foundation again if implemented.

Now, these are all indispensable steps for global security, but there remains a big difference between what we're doing, and what we ought to be doing. Let me just give us a few indicators of what we should be doing. The G8 $20 billion pledges should be a floor and certainly not a ceiling because more funds will be required. The national pledges for the G8 and other pledges that have joined the G8 need to be turned into real money and real projects. Even though it represents a minimum of the $20 billion goal, only $17 billion has now been pledged three years later. Of the $17 billion pledged, only a small fraction has gone to specific projects. Big bureaucratic obstacles still stand in the way of urgent action and all of us have to insist that these obstacles be removed by the personal involvement of our leadership, starting with President Putin and also President Bush, but also involving other leaders. We must develop the Global Partnership against catastrophic terrorism into an effective, focused, well-funded and truly global effort. Our leaders must personally put this issue on their front burners and they must cut through the barriers to cooperation.

Japan's leadership and action is essential to the success of the Global Partnership. The ingredients of leadership that make Japan a deserving candidate for permanent membership in the UN Security Council also make Japan a natural leader in the Global Partnership. Japan is the only nation to suffer a nuclear attack and the first nation to suffer a lethal terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction, so the people of Japan know that preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction has to be right at the top of our security priority list. Even before the Global Partnership was formally established at the G8 summit in June of 2002, Japan was engaged in important threat reduction activities. Japan has taken the lead in helping Asian countries strengthen their capacities in the area of export control. Japan has contributed to threat reduction activities. Japan has started helping Russia dismantle decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines that was mentioned a few moments ago. Japan has participated in multilateral projects to dispose of plutonium formerly contained in Soviet nuclear weapons. Japan has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Japan has supported the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and Japan has championed the strengthening of IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol.

These efforts are all very important, but given the magnitude and the urgency of the threat, I believe it is time for Japanese leaders and the Japanese public to consider whether Japan can do more, much more. Japan's pledge of $200 million is the lowest of any G8 member, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of national wealth. Budget pressures, I know, are tight here in Japan, as they are nearly everywhere, but if preventing nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is, indeed, our number one security priority, all countries, including Japan, must step up their efforts. More funds are essential but more funds are not enough. In addition to submarine dismantlement and plutonium disposition, Japan can work with the United States, Russia and the IAEA to accelerate the global cleanout of weapons-grade uranium from research reactors and sites throughout the world and Japan can also support chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia.

Just one example. Senator Lugar and I, on a couple of occasions, have been to a very remote spot in Russia called Shchuchye. At that one facility, there are stored 1,971,000 tubes full of nerve gas; each tube would be about the size that could fit into a terrorist's briefcase. Those materials are awaiting destruction and the time and clock ticks because no matter what you do in terms of security, no one can guarantee that there cannot be some kind of insider theft or sabotage. So these are enormously important undertakings that have to have help from the international community. The United States is putting up a great deal of money at Shchuchye. Other nations—Great Britain, Canada and others—

are helping there but this would be an area where Japan could step up to the plate and I think it would be widely understood, particularly in Japan that has suffered from its own chemical terrorist attack.

Japan can also join the United States and other donors in funding a very important fossil fuel plant in Russia so that the last Russian reactor producing plutonium for nuclear weapons can be shut down. Two of those reactors are being shut down with help from the United States; Japan could help greatly in the international effort to shut down the third one.

Wrapping it all up, no matter what country we call home, we should all agree that the central organizing security principle of the 21st century should be preventing the spread or use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and for this mission, we need all the tools in our collective arsenals. We cannot succeed without Japan's leadership, Japan's resources, Japan's example and Japan's commitment, as well as the resources and commitment of many other countries.

As I view it, we are in the race between cooperation and catastrophe. If we have a nuclear disaster, the world will demand immediate action to prevent the next one and I have no doubt that after a disaster, most of the things I have outlined this morning would be demanded by our publics. My question for all of us this morning is, why wait until the day after? We must do it now.

Thank you very much.

Introductory Remarks

"Japan's cooperation to Russia in the field of dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines and other related projects"

Ambassador Issei Nomura, Japanese Representative of the Governing Council of the Japan-Russia Committee to Assist the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Russian Federation, Ambassador of Japan to the Russian Federation

Senator Sam Nunn, Mr. Antipov, Deputy Director, Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation, distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great honor for me to share with you today the experience of Japan's cooperation to Russia in the field of dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines and other related projects.

My personal involvement in this area of work goes back to 1993 when I was the Director General of European and Oceanian Australian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I still remember vividly the day when the fact that the Russian Navy had dumped low-level radioactive liquid waste of nuclear submarines into the Sea of Japan was disclosed and the Japanese public made immediate uproar against the dumping. It was already around midnight when I hurried up to the private apartment of then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tsutomu Hata. Minister Hata made an urgent phone call to his Russian counterpart, Mr. Andrey Kozyrev, asking him to take necessary measures as soon as possible to stop the dumping.

This incident made the Japanese people realize the fact that the environment around them is vulnerable to the nuclear-related activities in the neighboring countries. They also came to understand that, should the decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines remain undismantled, it would become a potential risk affecting their own security. Needless to say, the primary responsibility of dismantling Russian nuclear submarines lies with Russia. However, it was evident that Russia alone could not dismantle all of its nuclear submarines within a reasonable period of time, and the longer decommissioned nuclear submarines remained neglected, the bigger would be the risk of environmental damage to the neighboring countries. I should also mention that after the end of Cold War emerged the real danger of terrorist groups making use of nuclear materials which are not properly guarded.

In this context, too, cooperation in the field of denuclearization has become very important. Thus, Japan had decided to cooperate with Russia in its denuclearization efforts. Alongside with this context, G8 countries established its Global Partnership in June 2002. In order to carry out concrete cooperation projects with Russia, Japan concluded a bilateral agreement in October 1993 and established a special bilateral committee, to which Japan has provided up until now approximately 20 billion yen.

Ladies and gentlemen,
As you can easily imagine from the Japanese peoples' reaction against the dumping of low-level radioactive liquid waste, the Committee's first task was to work out practical measures that would prevent further dumping of liquid radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan. The two countries chose to construct a floating facility designed to process low-level radioactive liquid waste. The project began in January 1996. The construction of the facility was completed in April 1998 and it was handed over to Russia in November 2001.

The facility, given a beautiful name "Suzuran", meaning lily of the valley, is a floating processing facility and now moored at the Zvezda Shipyard in Bolshoi Kamen city near Vladivostok. It has a capacity to treat up to 7,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste per year, which is enough to process not only liquid radioactive waste already stored in the Russian Far East but also additional waste which will be generated by the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines in the region. According to a Russian source, not even a drop of liquid radioactive waste has been dumped in the Sea of Japan since "Suzuran" started to operate, and we consider the "Suzuran" project to be a huge success.

It was quite clear from the very early stage of the activities of the Committee that the main task of the Committee would be the dismantlement of decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines. Even at present, approximately 30 decommissioned nuclear submarines are moored in the neighborhood of Vladivostok and in Kamchatka. Many of these submarines are still carrying nuclear fuel and most of them have been moored for over ten years. Therefore, there is a potential danger of serious radioactive contamination from those submarines suffering from corrosion due to years of immersion in seawater. We should also consider the risk of nuclear materials being illegally taken out of the submarines and falling into the hands of terrorists.

When Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi visited Russia in January 2003, he and the Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to accelerate the Committee's work on dismantlement projects and this was specifically mentioned in the "Japan-Russia Action Plan" adopted at that time by the two leaders. Prime Minister Koizumi named the project for dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Far East of Russia "Star of Hope", named after the Zvezda Shipyard which implements most of dismantling works. Since then, both sides have intensively negotiated to work out the plan for the dismantlement of a Victor III class nuclear submarine as the first "Star of Hope" project. I remember very well the tough and crucial negotiations that I conducted with Mr. Antipov, my Russian counterpart in the Committee, in Moscow as well as in Tokyo. We both sometimes use mobile phones. After an implementing arrangement and necessary contracts had been concluded, the project started in December 2003 and was successfully completed in December last year.

Ladies and gentlemen,
I would like to emphasize once again that it is Russia which has the primary responsibility to dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines in a safe and efficient manner and in accordance with the applicable environmental regulations. In this context, I would like to commend the Russian government for its decision to complete dismantlement of all the nuclear submarines by the year 2010. It is Japan's hope as well to dismantle nuclear submarines as expeditiously as possible. Therefore, we have already decided to cooperate in dismantling another five submarines. The negotiation to conclude a necessary implementing arrangement is under way and is coming at its final stage, I hope. We are expecting that the project to dismantle these additional five submarines will start by the end of this year.

I am happy to say that by now the "Star of Hope" has indeed begun to shine. I have to admit that the works carried out by both the Japanese and the Russian sides in the past were not always easy. However, we were able to overcome difficulties whenever we encountered them. I pay high tribute to those persons involved in these valuable works.

Recalling my involvement in this matter, I would like to enumerate four specific points in which I feel particular interest now. Firstly, we need to increase public awareness of the necessity of the dismantlement. Today's seminar definitely serves this purpose in Japan. And I remember that a similar symposium was held in Moscow in the spring last year, which I attended.

I thank the Japan-Russia Committee for Cooperation on Reducing Nuclear Weapons and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for

jointly hosting this seminar. I thank Senator Sam Nunn and Mr. Antipov for participating in the seminar. And, personally, I am very glad to see many Russian participants at today's seminar. In addition to organizing this kind of seminars, we need to use information technology and to ask for the cooperation of mass-media and private sectors, so that our important tasks could be better understood and supported by the public.

Secondly, we need to obtain enough relevant information from the Russian side and to have adequate access to the places where the dismantlement work is conducted. This is vital, not only for the smooth dismantlement process in accordance with the contracts, but also for providing basic information to the public on what is going on in the shipyards. We need to satisfy our taxpayers with our proper accountability.

Thirdly, I would like to stress the importance of safety measures. The dismantlement of Victor III class submarine was completed, fortunately, without any accident. We have to make sure that sufficient safety measures are taken, so that no accidents would happen in the course of dismantlement and other related activities, such as transportation and removal of nuclear substances.

Finally, I would like to point out that the dismantlement should be simultaneously conducted in both the Far Eastern and the North Western parts of Russia. Since we are tackling globally concerned issue, it is quite natural and legitimate for us to expect that the dismantlement will proceed with more or less similar speed. I hear the report that the dismantlement projects in the Far East are much delayed in comparison with those in the North West. We need to speed up our projects in this region. In this connection, we highly appreciate the participation of Australia in our projects by contributing 10 million Australian dollars to the Japan-Russia Committee. We welcome the participation of other countries as well.

Those are the points of particular interest to me, and I hope they will be somehow covered in the course of discussions of today's seminar. I rather confined my speech to the question of dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, but in concluding, I would like to thank Senator Sam Nunn for a very enlightening, I must say, speech on the need of strengthening G8 Global Partnership.

"Present condition, problems and perspective of the international cooperation in the field of dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines at the Russian Far East"

Mr. Sergey Antipov, Russian Representative of the Governing Council of the Japan-Russia Committee to Assist the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Russian Federation, Deputy Director, Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation

Senator Nunn, Ambassador Nomura, participants,
In recent years, many countries of the world constantly focused their attention on the problem of dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines. It is linked to nuclear disarmament process, non-proliferation of nuclear material, reduction of terrorism threat, and protection of environment.

Out of the total number of 250 nuclear submarines built in Russia during the past half century, 195 submarines were decommissioned during the last 20 years. Two nuclear missile cruisers and almost 40 nuclear logistic-supported maintenance vessels followed suit. Four coastal technical bases for nuclear Navy fleet were liquidated. However, all spent nuclear fuel remained unprocessed, either in reactors of these nuclear submarines or in half-destroyed storage facilities in the coastal bases. Thousands of tons of solid and liquid radioactive waste were also left. Facilities of the bases were also contaminated with radiation. All these coincided in time with a growing wave of violence and terrorism in the world, when terrorists are trying to achieve their goals, proceeding with such horrible acts like explosions on trains, gas poisoning in subways, airline hijackings and destroying the skyscrapers and trying hard to obtain weapons, materials and technologies of mass destruction. Highly-enriched nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear submarines may be used to build radiological weapons, so-called "dirty bomb," or just to create panic as a psychological weapon.

Radioactivity level of decommissioned nuclear submarines and coastal bases has reached dozens of millions Ci and almost ninety percent of radioactive materials were found in spent nuclear fuel. It is noteworthy the level of accumulated radiation is almost the same in North West and Far East Russia. Realizing the danger of this situation was one of the reasons to promote the initiative by the leaders of major countries under the framework of the Global Partnership. One of the priorities of this initiative was the dismantling of multi-purpose nuclear submarines. In order to solve this problem, we have to do a huge amount of work on nuclear submarines as well as on coastal technical bases. We have to secure the physical protection, to maintain high technical competence at coastal bases and to build onshore storages of nuclear reactors. We have to create infrastructure for nuclear waste, to advance ecological rehabilitation of the coastal bases territories and to dismantle nuclear vessels.

Generically, what I have mentioned above is called the problem of complex decommissioning of nuclear submarines. According to our estimate, the cost to solve this problem is around $4 billion. The ultimate goal that we have to achieve in nuclear submarine dismantlement is the safe unloading of spent nuclear fuel from submarines, and their transporting and reprocessing in the facilities at Mayak. We also have to safely cut nuclear submarines, as well as to safely handle with chemical, toxic and radioactive waste arising from that. In particular, we

need to put nuclear parts in the special long-term storage facilities.

Over the last three years, Russia has spent about $70 million on dismantlement projects annually, which might be not enough. But we cannot expect additional funds from the Russian budget. Therefore, you will understand the necessity of the international cooperation to tackle the problems for the next 10 to 12 years, or we cannot achieve our goals.

The aim of the international cooperation is to consolidate material and intellectual resources. All countries of the Global Partnership, including new members, have announced that they are interested in cooperation and are ready to allocate funds in solving this problem

The countries which announced their contributions to the Global Partnership are planning to spend the major part of the funds for dismantlement of nuclear submarines. But in reality, the amount under concluded contracts is much less than the initially pledged amount. Moreover, the total amount announced by participants of the Global Partnership for the dismantlement project is about two times less than what we need for solving this problem. That is why we have to continue our diplomatic efforts and to develop international contacts to receive necessary funds as well as to seek possibilities within the Russian budget.

When we speak about the continued development of international cooperation, it is worth noting what we have already achieved. My colleagues will talk about it in detail later. So I will speak about the legal and economic aspects of international cooperation. Currently, in Russia, the legal infrastructure for bilateral cooperation with countries of the Global Partnership has been almost completed. Bilateral agreements have been concluded with the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Norway, Sweden, France and Japan. An interesting case is the cooperation with Australia. Although Australia provided a certain amount of money—approximately $7 million, it suggested not to conclude a bilateral agreement with Russia but to give this money to Japan. Japan, within its framework of cooperation, will use this money for the intended purposes.

Apart from bilateral mechanisms of cooperation in this area, we can see that multilateral approaches are also widely used. It is because, firstly, the partner countries want to have the same conditions as other countries for cooperation with Russia, in tax exemption, liability and access to project sites. Secondly, they want to avoid creating unnecessary competitions or niches of fields that are not covered by this cooperation. Thirdly, many countries can provide only small amounts of money, at least in the near future while the cost for realizing these projects is very high. Therefore, there is the necessity to consolidate funds from each country into one source. For such reasons, the various mechanisms for multilateral cooperation arise. One of such multilateral mechanisms is the MNEPR agreement. This agreement took over the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership initiative between the Scandinavian countries and Russia. The aim of the agreement is to consolidate efforts in solving the environmental problems, especially those related to nuclear wastes and spent fuels in North West Russia. For the realization of the initiative, there was a special fund established within the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Currently, out of about $190 million, the total amount of the fund, approximately $150 million are allocated for nuclear problems, so-called nuclear window. One other instrument for multilateral cooperation is the Artic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program, in which the U.S., Norway, Great Britain and Russia participate.

I introduced the mechanisms of funding, sources, as well as scope of international cooperation, and mentioned the names of our partners. Let us see what has really been done within these frameworks. Out of the total number of 112 nuclear submarines, which have already been dismantled, 31 were implemented by the funds of international cooperation. Coastal complexes for unloading of spent nuclear fuels from nuclear submarines and facilities for reprocessing liquid nuclear waste were built

in the Zvezda and Zvezdochka shipyards. One of them is the "Landysh(Suzuran)" facility. A facility for processing solid radioactive waste was built in the Polyarninskiy shipyard in the Murmansk region. Several dozen containers and some container yards as well as a special train were built for temporary storage and transfer of spent nuclear fuels.

The facilities of technical infrastructure and waterproof coverings for dry storages of spent nuclear fuel were built in the Andreyev Bay in the Murmansk region. Dosimetrical and other equipments were purchased for monitoring of situations and ensuring safety of the personnel. Sea tugboats and powerful self-propelling cranes were purchased to load the containers. The first phase of the Strategic Master Plan for dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines was worked out.

Most of these tasks have been realized in North West Russia, which led to a noticeable improvement of situation there. The attention of most donors and their funds are directed on that region. At the same time, in Far East Russia, our partners are only Japan and Australia that recently joined the project. Participation of the United States is confined to cooperation in dismantlement of strategic nuclear submarines. The situation in the Far East region is very serious. It is characterized by the following problems: lack of onshore long-term storage facilities for nuclear reactor compartments; insufficient information on the condition of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste at coastal maintenance bases; need for special approaches to solution of the problem of complex decommissioning of two damaged nuclear submarines; the lack of a conditioning and processing facility for solid radioactive waste; urgent need for complex decommissioning of the nuclear submarines in Kamchatka and transportation of the reactor compartments to Primorskiy district; the lack of a system for toxic and noxious substance handling; no way of performing decommissioning nuclear maintenance vessels; no way of removal of spent nuclear fuels from the Zvezda shiprard by railway; the lack of regional monitoring system; and most importantly, the lack of attention of the Global Partnership's participants to the Far East region of Russia.

For speedy solution of such problems as improving the safety of spent nuclear fuels and radioactive wastes, strengthening anti-terrorism measures and protecting the environment, it is essential not only to strengthen the Russia-Japan and Russia-Australia cooperation in the region but also to introduce both human and financial resources from other members of the Global Partnership.

We have only one planet. A large-scale nuclear or radioactive incident, especially one caused by terrorists, could give negative impact on many countries and regions, wherever it takes place. Our common aim is not to let that happen. I hope that this seminar will help us all better grasp the situation and take action in a constructive way.