

Panel Discussion (morning session)

“Reviewing Global Partnership: Its Achievements for International Security and Cooperation”

Coordinator:

Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Adviser of the CSIS International Security Program

Panelists:

Mr. Takeshi Nakane, Deputy Director-General, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Mr. Sergey Antipov, Russian Representative of the Governing Council, Deputy Director of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation

Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Director, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DDCR), Institute of World Economy and International Relations

Mr. Fumihiko Yoshida, Editorial Writer, Asahi Shimbun

Mr. Nils Böhmer, Russian Program Director, the Bellona Foundation

Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Adviser of the CSIS International Security Program

This morning's panel discussion will look at the G8 Global Partnership and try to assess its value in its first three years. The Global Partnership was established only in June, 2002. But the idea of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs originated a decade or so earlier in the United States' Senate. Today's keynote speaker, Senator Sam Nunn, and his Republican Senate colleague, Richard Lugar, launched a cooperative threat reduction in the early 1990s as a way of helping the financially-stressed states of the former Soviet Union meet their nuclear disarmament obligations with the United States. From the outset, the Nunn-Lugar programs, as they came to be known, were essentially a U.S. responsibility with the United States paying the lion's share of the cooperative threat reduction bill, close to \$6 billion during the decade of the 1990s.

But 9/11 created a new and a very different security challenge. The main threat was no longer the risk that Russia might re-generate its nuclear capabilities. Instead, it was the very real concern that

nuclear or other sensitive equipment or materials would fall into the hands of terrorists of hostile regimes. 9/11, together with a number of other terrorist incidents around the world, showed us that all countries were threatened by catastrophic terrorism and that all countries must bear a responsibility for reducing the threat.

In response to this new challenge, G8 leaders at their June 2002 summit in Kananaskis, set up the Global Partnership. They agreed to raise \$20 billion over 10 years to secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and materials in Russia and elsewhere. They recognized explicitly that a main purpose of the partnership was to prevent WMD terrorism. This month marks the third anniversary of the founding of the Global Partnership and next month in Gleneagles, Scotland, G8 leaders will try to set a course for the future.

This morning at this panel we will try to do our own assessment of the Global Partnership. If we are frank with ourselves, we would have to admit that

the record so far has been mixed. There are several positive factors. First, more resources have been committed to threat reduction activities than certainly would otherwise have been the case. \$17 billion over 10 years has been pledged so far toward the Kananaskis goal of \$20 billion. It would be \$19 billion if Russia's own contribution were included.

Second, the burden is certainly more equitably shared than it used to be. The U.S. is still providing half of the \$20 billion over 10 years but it is a lot better than when the U.S. essentially monopolized threat reduction activities.

Third, the partnership has expanded beyond the G8 as donors and beyond Russia as recipients. More than a half a dozen countries, including in Asia, South Korea and Australia, have formally become donor partners. Ukraine has joined as a recipient and several other states of the former Soviet Union are seeking membership. Iraq, Libya and Albania have also received threat-reduction funding, although none of them are yet formally members of the Global Partnership.

And, fourth, Russia is receiving substantial assistance in the two areas that President Putin has identified as Russia's top priorities; namely, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines and the elimination of chemical weapons.

But the pictures are not entirely positive; there are several negatives. First, the funding target has not been reached. In the view of the United States, \$20 billion should be a floor and not a ceiling, yet the partners so far have only pledged \$17 billion. So far, the U.S. has pledged \$10 billion over 10 years; Germany, \$1.5 billion; Italy, \$1.3 billion; the EU collectively, \$1.3 billion; France, \$971 million; Canada, \$800 million; U.K., \$750 million; and Japan, a little over \$200 million. All of these countries can do more.

Second, serious obstacles have impeded implementation. The Russian bureaucracy has been slow to negotiate implementation agreements and get

them ratified. This problem has been exacerbated by the recent governmental reorganization in Moscow. Disagreements persist between Russia and donor states on access of donor state personnel to work sites in Russia. The continuing inability of U.S. personnel to gain access to certain nuclear sites in Russia has slowed down efforts to upgrade the security of Russian nuclear materials and warheads. A longstanding dispute between Washington and Moscow on liability protections for U.S. workers has brought progress on key projects, such as plutonium disposition, to a halt.

Third, largely due to these impediments, only a small fraction of the \$17 billion pledged has actually been committed to specific projects. Some donors, such as France, have yet to get any concrete projects underway.

Fourth, while progress in submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons elimination have addressed important Russian priorities, the Global Partnership has not given enough attention to other activities that may be more relevant to the critical goal of preventing WMD terrorism; in particular, strengthening the security of nuclear materials and biological agents against theft or seizure.

These are only a few of the factors that have to be taken into account in developing a global partner scorecard. For the rest of the morning, we are going to go into great depth on some of those factors.

Mr. Takeshi Nakane, Deputy Director-General, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

At this seminar cooperation under the G8 Global Partnership will be focused on. In this area, proliferation of WMD is regarded as one of the significant challenges besetting the international community. Therefore, we are making efforts on various fronts to prevent the proliferation of WMD. Japan has been making efforts in the non-proliferation as well as arms control, field especially with our neighbor countries. In Asia, We held seminars focusing

on export control, counter measures against biological and chemical weapons as well as anti-terrorism. However, we do not have time to address all of these issues today, so we should focus especially on the G8 Global Partnership.

The Global Partnership has four priority areas. The first one is dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. The second is elimination of chemical weapons. The third is disposition of fissile material and the fourth is employment of scientists formerly working in weapons research. Different donor countries have different emphasizing areas, and in the case of Japan we are focusing on the dismantling of the decommissioned nuclear submarines as well as the disposition of the surplus plutonium.

When the support for the dismantling of the nuclear weapons begun in the former Soviet Union countries, I was the director of Arms Control and Disarmament Division at MOFA, and was involved directly in the setting up of a framework of denuclearization of the former Soviet Union countries from 1992 till 1994. We established the framework, through discussions in Japan on the way of the support for the former Soviet countries, towards nuclear disarmament as well as reduction of WMD.. When we discussed this with our Russian counterparts in 1992, they requested Japan's support for their efforts on dismantlement of their chemical weapons. At that time, as the Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted and obliged Japan to take certain measures to dispose 'abandoned chemical weapons' in China, which were abandoned during the last war by the former Japanese Army. Because of strong public opinion that Japan should focus our efforts on disposition of these chemical weapons abandoned in China, therefore, we did not provide support to Russia in the area of chemical weapons for the time being.

Various countries, such as the U.K., the U.S., Norway, Canada and so on, have been implementing the dismantlement of nuclear submarines under the G8 Global Partnership. In addition, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, Italy and Norway are making efforts as well in the area of the elimination of

the chemical weapons. The International Technological Science Center (ITSC) has established for the employment of scientists formerly working in weapons research. Japan has been participating in the efforts of this center since the ITSC was launched. Apart from ITSC, I understand that the U.S. has been taking the initiative to making improvements in this area.

Regarding surplus plutonium, detailed discussions will be taken place in a session scheduled for this afternoon. Efforts are currently being made in negotiating for a multilateral framework agreement.

In the last three years, the related projects of the G8 Global Partnership have achieved good results. To prevent the proliferation of WMD as well as the related material, we need to have international cooperation to achieve the common goal of non-proliferation, and the political will of each country must be mustered. I believe that the G8 Global Partnership has achieved certain results and that the U.S. has played a very important role in leading this initiative. I certainly hope that further progress will be made going on and in this regard, there has to be a very close exchange of information as well as cooperation between the donor countries and the recipient countries.

Regarding Japan's efforts made under the G8 Global Partnership at the Kananaskis summit, we have announced that \$200 million would be contributed, out of which \$100 million would be allocated to the dismantling of nuclear submarines in Far East Russia and the remaining \$100 million would be allocated to dealing with surplus plutonium. On the efforts of Japan in the area of dismantlement of the nuclear submarines, Ambassador Nomura has already talked about this issue in detail. As for the employment of researchers involved in weapons development, Japan has already provided \$60 million support through ITSC. Further, as a board member of the ITSC, we are committed to working toward non-proliferation through scientific technical cooperation, and we will continue to make efforts in this area.

Prior to the Global Partnership, in 1993, to the three countries with strategic nuclear arms deployed apart from Russia, which are Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, we have provided support for denuclearization amounting to ¥3.63 billion in areas of the establishment of State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) and medical support. In particular, the support for establishing SSAC in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus was the significant contribution for their accession to NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Among them, Ukraine has been made to become a recipient country for the Global Partnership.

I would like to talk about Japan's view in smooth implementation of the projects within the framework of the Global Partnership. At the Kananaskis Summit meeting, the G8 leaders agreed on and clarified the total amount of funding, and rules and mechanisms for implementing projects were also clarified. In implementing the project, we needed to clear away the obstacles. For this purpose, guidelines have been provided in the areas of access to sites, tax exemption, and indemnification on liability issues. The guidelines prescribe necessary measures to be implemented for problem-solving.

At the Kanasukis Summit meeting, we advocating the need for guidelines, stating that smooth implementation of projects would require such guidelines. The support program that was to be implemented in Russia from 1993, because of the prevailing problems, was delayed in implementation; therefore, at the G8 we have been asking and proposing that agreement be made and this was realized accordingly. We are very much encouraged that Russia has also agreed to this guideline.

To implement the projects, accesses to information as well as to project sites are essential. Since we are going to provide support to Russia, there should be tax-exemption measures for products that will be exported to Russia or imported from overseas to Russia. Indemnification, liability issues must be resolved. During the implementation of projects, the extraction of nuclear materials will be necessary in some cases, which is very danger-

ous. Therefore, damage could be incurred by any accident to third parties through implementation or activities related to implementation of the project. If the Japanese government or the project contractors have to bear the liability, it would become an obstacle to committing themselves to implementing such projects; therefore, there has to be a framework of indemnification for such liabilities. For this purpose, proactive measures must be taken by recipient countries.

I am conscious of time, and therefore I cannot give you details of some examples of what kind of obstacles we have faced. Since we were working on military facilities, sometimes the Japanese parties were not provided sufficient access. When the delegation was sent to the site, there was not good enough communication on the Russian side and the Japanese delegation had to go back to Japan without the expected results. Therefore, coordination on the part of Russia will be essential. Through these experiences, sometimes we find it difficult to proceed smoothly with these projects.

Regarding the dismantlement of the nuclear submarines, on the part of Japan, we maintain interests in projects such as the onshore storage facility for reactor compartment and the radiation monitoring.

As already mentioned, compared to North West Russia, the process of dismantlement of nuclear submarines in the Far East Russia is being delayed. Under such a circumstance, we commend very highly the efforts made by Australia that 10 million Australian dollars have been contributed for the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines in this region. I hope that similar contributions will be made by other countries as well.

I would like to talk about Japan's view regarding the Global Partnership going forward; that is the last point I want to make. The donor countries' participation must be increased in number; that is very important. Outreach activities are an area where Japan would like to take an active role. We would like to involve many more countries by advocating

the importance of this Global Partnership.

There is also a need for countries to increase their financial contribution to this effort. On the part of Japan, I would like to say that for denuclearization projects in Russia, Japan has pledged \$20.4 billion; however, ¥14.7 billion remains unused currently. Since this portion has remained unused, it is going to be very difficult to gain acceptance by the Japanese taxpayers for increasing the funding further. We hope that these funds will be put to effective use in the focus areas for Japan such as dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines as well as dealing with the surplus plutonium after reaching a framework agreement so that there is effective utilization of these contributed funds.

At the same time, what is common in terms of all assistance is that we would like to see aid with "Japan's face" and that is one of priorities of the Japanese government's providing assistance. Not just to provide funds but we would like to bring to bear the advantages that Japan has and we would like to provide assistance where specific results can become visible so that support from the citizens of Japan can be invited. Also, the post—project evaluation will be very important as well and this is what we would like to advocate to the participants of the Global Partnership.

Mr. Sergey Antipov, Russian Representative of the Governing Council, Deputy Director of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation

The Global Partnership has made great contributions for increasing global security. We cannot overestimate it. Certainly, there are difficulties in realization of this initiative. There are some bilateral frictions in realization of practical works. However, it is not unusual because tasks are extremely difficult, complicated, and dangerous. They do not have similar activities, but the work is going on.

What would be problems to the more efficient development of the Global Partnership initiative? I remember, first of all, that from the end of 2002 or

early 2003, at the level of senior officials of the Global Partnership (when France was the chairman), there were heated discussions on what kinds of problems should be considered in the Global Partnership. In the statement of the leaders, four main problems were mentioned: utilization of nuclear submarines, destruction of chemical weapons, disposition of nuclear materials, and employment of scientists. But there were countless efforts to expand the scope to include safety of nuclear energy, biotechnology and so on. We have made tremendous efforts to reach the following common understanding: first, we should achieve some good results on these four areas, and then, maybe, we will see possibilities of expanding the scope.

Italy, for example, suggested at the high level dialogue to include into problems of the Global Partnership construction of a charged particle accelerator. I understand that some scientists and companies are interested in it, but it has nothing to do with the fight against terrorism and nonproliferation of nuclear materials.

As for the problems that impedes the progress of the Global Partnership. At any meeting or forum, somebody raises taxes, access and liability issues. But we should not repeat that every time. The situation changes with time very rapidly and substantially. Among those who have contracts with Russia right now, who has problem with avoiding taxation? There are no problems of exempting from taxes. They are old formulas which have been just copied from one report to another.

However, the problem of access exists and will exist. We cannot make strategically important facilities for national security spots of sightseeing excursions. We cannot let anybody go there at any given time. Access should be given in the necessary volume to organizations only for the purpose of controlling and monitoring the progress of works. There are moments when we have to postpone those visits which have nothing to do with the problems of the Global Partnership. You should understand that today we are solving this problem with all our partners together.

The third area is the liability. There is a great compromise mechanism, which was introduced in the MNEPR, of how to decide the exemption of liability. All members of this program signed the protocol, except the United States. They have their own position; we have talks with them on this subject. The day before yesterday, our Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kislyak told us these talks progressed very smoothly, very well, and there is hope to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement formula.

But there are some approaches, which I don't understand. For example, in the case of Japan, we have utilized one nuclear submarine. We had an implementing arrangement and there was such a great result. Although a whole year has passed since the first utilization, we have not been able to sign the arrangement for the next submarine yet because the Japanese side started to demand on liability. That is not included in our intergovernmental agreement. So we offer three things; there is nothing else. First, let us act within the framework of the agreement between Russia and Japan. If the Japanese side does not like it, we have to make some changes into the intergovernmental agreement. If Japan wants to have the same conditions as all other states, Japan can join MNEPR. Without having legal basis, without intergovernmental agreement, we cannot give any other guarantees. Even ROSATOM, which is very powerful in Russia, has no authority to decide this matter in a different way. Sometimes these artificial obstacles prevent us from conducting our job. For a whole year we cannot start the utilization of the second nuclear submarine with fund from Japan. Therefore, for a whole year, not a single cent of Australian money, which had been already transferred to the account of the Japan-Russia Committee, was sent to the Russian side. This tells us that those who want to achieve real results can achieve them and those who are just trying to find some excuses can find them.

I would like to mention here the examples of good, practical, pragmatic cooperation with Germany, Great Britain, Norway and Canada. Just for comparison, Canada signed an intergovernmental

agreement with Russia a year ago and immediately, in one month's time, concluded a contract for the utilization of three nuclear submarines. They have already signed a contract for the next three. This is an example of how we should work when we want to achieve results. I am an optimist and I hope that such kind of frictions that we have in the bilateral contacts disappear and we can find the way forward, because we understand the complexity of problems of security for the world community and it should eliminate unsubstantial frictions from our way of cooperation.

I will mention one more positive experience from the Global Partnership. It is how to create new systems which help our work progress. Probably everybody knows the Andreyev case in the North West of Russia. We have cooperated with U.K., Norway, Sweden and Italy to organize our works in the most optimal way. We reached an agreement and organized small committees among these countries. The work started to move much more effectively because each of the participants can see the abilities and possibilities of the other side. We can immediately agree on what the other side is doing. The situation is now absolutely transparent and we are trying to use the same way for solving of how to stop the operation of a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG). We organize an international coordinating group. Only those states which are ready to contribute their money for the solving of this problem joined it, and this work started to move in a more efficient way.

I ask all of you to study the experience of others. If there are some problems in our cooperation, we can always find examples of solving these problems such as access, liability and all other problems.

Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Director, DDCR, Institute of World Economy and International Relations

The Global Partnership is almost three years old and one-third of its timetable has already been expired. It is originally planned to be completed within 10 years. And now I think we could have some pre-

liminary evaluations to what extent the partnership was successful and where there is room for improvement.

We will look into four major priorities decided by the head of states; nuclear submarines; chemical weapons; safety of fissile materials, and the problem of brain drain. I think that probably the situation in two areas could be described as successful, in one area results remain mixed, and in one area, the situation has not been significantly improved.

As for the dismantlement of nuclear submarines, I think it is generally a success story. Despite existing problems, I think that we face considerable progress here, especially in the Russian north, in the Murmansk region of the Russian Federation and we of course want to see similar progress in the Far East where Japan could make significant contribution and already there were some successful projects implemented.

The situation of chemical weapons disposition is more complicated and the results are mixed. On one hand, we have significant increase of Russia's own contribution. The Russian federal expense on chemical weapons, increased by two-fold, maybe three-fold compared to a low ceiling, sometime in 1998 or 1999. The chemical weapons program is the most expensive. While \$4 billion needed for eliminating Russian nuclear submarines, chemical weapons destruction program is estimated at about \$8 billion. Probably the estimate would increase and, of course, without considerable international assistance, the Russian Federation would not be able to complete the elimination of chemical weapons as it is required by conditions of the Chemical Weapons Convention so as to eliminate them fully by 2012.

Since the Global Partnership started, we have considerable progress with several nations, especially with Germany and Italy. Particularly with Germany's help, the only operational facility of chemical weapons destruction in Gornyi started its operation. It is a small facility. There is an agreement on building

up a bigger facility in Kambarka where all remaining Russian blister chemical agents would be eliminated. Here again Germany offered considerable assistance and we see progress. However, we have much less progress at another facility in Shchuchye where initially the bulk of Russian chemical weapons used to be eliminated. There was a plan to build two facilities there, one of them with international assistance, another one primarily with Russian money; however, due to Russian old bureaucratic instability and the delays in U.S. assistance for the Shchuchye plant, this program would have to be considerably modified. Now whether Russia would fulfill the interim deadline of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not associated with Shchuchye, but with another facility which is built in another region by primarily Russian own money. However, without Shchuchye, Russia would not be able to fulfill its commitments under CWC.

Here, international assistance still plays an important role and I would say, given the remaining problems with the U.S. assistance, participation of more countries is extremely desirable. Its stake is not only the fate of Russian domestic chemical weapons destruction program, not the problem that as long as chemical agents would be stored. They would represent a target for possible terrorist access, but also it is an important international problem that is the implementation of one of the most important international legal regimes, the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The third area, safety of radioactive materials, has made progress and it took place even before the Global Partnership was formally pronounced in 2002. There are numerous primarily U.S.-Russian projects in that area. They still go on and here I think it is another success story. Certainly, we all want to accelerate this process. We need to pay more attention, for instance, to a few research reactors where we have a significant concentration of highly-enriched uranium, since it could be potentially used for weapon or terrorist purposes. So here some more efforts are needed but still it is a successful story.

We face a real problem in the issue of brain drain, the problem of providing alternative jobs for people who worked or continue to work in the Russian weapon complex, not only in nuclear, but chemical and biological areas, too. And here I would like to mention a problem of biosafety could be solved not through site secret, as maybe an independent priority but through solution of this brain drain problem.

There is an interesting organization called the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) located in Moscow. Through that center, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent up to now, for biological institutions and organizations. The role of the center is certainly very important. However, there are several challenges which have not been solved yet. One challenge is that the center is not settled on the basis in Russia. Agreement between the Russian Federation and the ISTC has not been ratified so far for more than 10 years. Earlier this year, the Russian Presidential Administration initiated the ratification process. It has started but we expected that it would be quite slow and very unlikely that the Russian Federal Assembly would ratify the ISTC agreement earlier than next year. The successful ratification would depend on the fate of another bilateral U.S.-Russian agreement, which provides legal regulations for implementation of the U.S. assistance project; the current agreement will expire next year and so far it is not clear what would be the fate of the next agreement, whether it would be a follow-on agreement, a new agreement, or an amended agreement, particularly in the area of liability. We do not know but so far the fate of that agreement is not clear and it might affect ratification of the ISTC agreement as well.

A more fundamental problem is that ISTC is not enough. In terms of providing alternative jobs for dozens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people involving into research and development of weapons of mass destruction and associated areas at huge Russian weapons complexes in the Soviet times, ISTC budget is not enough and its further increase is needed. In recent years, the center experienced reduced American financial assistance,

and financing from other sources has been increased in order to compensate the decrease of American fund; however, new funds are needed.

I would like to especially mention the fact that many countries are concerned about biosafety issue and I think they have all rights to be concerned about that. Russia should be more receptive in addressing concerns of its partners. ISTC so far is the only channel through which the partners could address the issue of biosecurity with the established legal mechanism. There might be some incentives for Japan to increase its contribution. Japan is one of the few countries that experienced bioterrorist attacks and I think it would be worth considering the way to solve that problem. Although Japan is already a member of the ISTC, maybe a high focus on that center might also correlate with national security interests of Japan.

Mr. Fumihiko Yoshida, Editorial Writer, Asahi Shimbun

For a long time, all the issues including or related to the G8 Global Partnership, have been discussed and increased their importance. But compared to the period immediately after the end of the Cold War, the interest seems to be lessening. Therefore, you need to firmly establish newly public diplomacy. If not, it will be quite difficult to secure the budget of significant amount in the long-term. Including Japan, there are many countries, which have come to be more and more inward-looking. So you need to have a concept and story, which would be more convincing, especially to the taxpayers.

To be more specific, first, I would like to point out that ever since 9/11, the threat of nuclear terrorism seems to be looming large, but in the different context from the Cold War days. The Global Partnership is perhaps even more important in this respect. But when we think about the perception on nuclear issues in Japan, overwhelmingly it is the question of North Korea, without any question. Now and in the future, the strengthening of the nuclear arms of China may also be the great interest in Japan.

How about Russia? I do not think there are many people in Japan who believe that Russia will become a bigger threat in the future. So, within the understanding and awareness of the Japanese people, Russia's nuclear issues will be linked with more an environmental question. So looking at the overall picture, although the environmental issue is quite important without question, but there seems to be a perception gap, a difference in perception, when it comes to global threat. How can we fill in this gap? How can we be able to promote and enhance the public awareness so that the civil society can have a good understanding of the total picture? That, I believe, will be even more important, not only in Japan but in many other countries as well.

The second point I would like to make in relation to public diplomacy is much more primitive or simple question. After the ending of the Cold War, U.S.S.R. or the Russian Federation was placed in a great economic difficulty, and the Japanese people do remember that. But more recently the oil price has increased significantly and the Russian economy has improved to a great extent. Many Japanese are now visiting Russia and Russian people are visiting Japan. Of course, there are many economic issues to be surmounted further for Russia, but many people in Japan wonder why the Russian Federation is not able to stand on their own feet to fund the handling of the aftermath of the Cold War by themselves. How can you convince the Japanese public by securing accountability? It is an important point for the long-term continuation of the projects

The third point I would like to mention is the disclosure of information. Because the issue is involved with national security, of course there are certain limitations to the disclosure of information; I do understand that. But having said so, looking from the Japanese people's point of view in risks of environmental pollution, possible scenarios and preparedness have not been explained fully. Looking at the sea on the Russian Far East, the radioactive waste from the dismantling of the nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines were dumped and they

are being transported on the sea. Such things are not fully informed to the Japanese people. If we are to have projects, information needs to be disclosed as much as possible, so that you can remove the anxiety. That is one aspect of public diplomacy as I call it, very necessary to be conducted into the future.

Now, those younger generations who do not have any memory of the Cold War, for the past 10-some years, are increasing and they are coming to the fore of the leadership. The Cold War seems to be a very distant memory for them. I believe a positive aspect is that the ideological discontent or the conflict seems to no longer exist, but there is another aspect; how can you persuade and convince them for the necessity of international cooperation because the Russia behind the international cooperation is no longer there. Because they do not have any memory of Cold War, and it means that they cannot appreciate the necessity of international cooperation for cleaning up what other people have done in the past, which are supposed to be done by themselves. If they do not know the Cold War, they do not understand the seriousness of threats that could be posed by the failure of cooperation. So how can you involve such younger generation? Trying to convince them that international cooperation is still a very important task ahead.

**Mr. Nils Böhmer, Russian Program Director,
the Bellona Foundation**

Our organization has been working with the nuclear problems in North West Russia for more than 15 years. They have been focusing on the nuclear submarines there and also the reprocessing facilities in Siberia.

I will try to give an example of what is a success story with the G8, namely, dismantling of the nuclear submarines in North West Russia. If you count the number of nuclear submarines being dismantled in the North West in the latest year, it seems to be a success. But if you see what happened with the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from those dismantled submarines, I am not so sure if the suc-

cess story is so great any more because the spent nuclear fuel is mostly sent to Mayak for reprocessing and we know for sure that the reprocessing in Mayak is leading to environmental releases to the water reservoirs in Mayak. Some of that could be carried far north up to the Arctic Ocean again. We do not know well how spent nuclear fuel or the uranium and plutonium from the reprocessing are stored in Mayak. We even do not know whether the spent nuclear fuel or the reprocessed uranium and plutonium are better secured in Mayak than they are in a nuclear submarine in an Arctic military port. I would say that spent nuclear fuel inside the submarine in a Russian military base is more secure; it is more difficult for a terrorist to access that uranium or plutonium in the submarine base than when it is reprocessed and more or less ready to take away from Mayak.

From an environmental point of view, it is maybe better to keep, or 'to store' the spent nuclear fuel inside the submarines rather than reprocessing. That is something that the donor countries in the G8 have to take into account; do we really know that they are making the environment safer or the world a more secure place with reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel from the Russian submarine?

There has been mentioned a lot of bureaucratic problems that have hampered the process during recent years. When we come to liability and tax-exempt status, that has been true until the MNEPR program was signed in 2003. I also hope that Russia and the U.S. can solve their liability questions so that bureaucratic problems will not hamper the process in the future.

I also see the lack of information or more specific, the lack of access to bases, have in some cases been hampering the cleanup work, especially in North West Russia. But there are now the possibilities that governments can go and visit the sites. For example, Chance to visit Andreyev Bay is much bigger, which we didn't have for a last couple of years. So the access to information and access to bases have been much better lately and I think—I hope that will continue also in the future.

Another question is hampering the success of the G8 is the lack of a clear goal. What do the G8 countries really want to achieve? I think that the G8 countries have a much more cradle-to-grave perspective of the way to deal with the nuclear challenges in Russia. In North West Russia, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development has put forward, at least started the work of making a strategic master plan for how to deal with the radioactive waste and the spent nuclear fuel challenges in North West Russia and so far that has been a great step forward in order to address which bottlenecks exist in the decommissioning of the spent nuclear fuel challenges in North West Russia.

The G8 countries must realize that in order to achieve their ultimate goal, which is to secure the spent nuclear fuel and to better the environmental situation in Russia, there will be a need for making a strategic master plan for the whole Russia to identify the bottlenecks and also to identify ways to solving those bottlenecks. A master plan would also make it much easier to achieve another difficulty that the G8 faces, namely, the lack of coordination between the donor countries. If you have a master plan, you have a much better possibility to coordinate the multilateral efforts, and there will be a much better coordination of the international funding. In this respect, I welcome the project taking place in Andreyev Bay where the donor countries are sitting together and coordinating their work. At the same time, similar mechanisms are needed for countries which maybe would like to sponsor similar projects in Gremikha or in the Pacific Fleet, for achieving a better understanding or better coordination of how to solve similar problems in Russia. That is a way that the G8 could make better progress.

And, of course, in achieving goals, I think it is very important that you have the public participation, both from the local population and also from the NGOs. Unless you manage to get the public and the NGOs together to understand that these are real issues that we have to tackle, it will be very difficult to succeed in making the project real.

Q&A

Mr. Dieter Rudolph, US AMEC Program Director and Steering Group Co-Chair

I have a question on the issue of public diplomacy. The Bellona Foundation has been very successful in their public diplomacy with their efforts. What advice do you have to focus regarding the effort here in the Far East?

Mr. Nils Böhmer, Russian Program Director, the Bellona Foundation

I think one of the main challenges is access to information. Even the Russian government does not know the exact information about the spent nuclear fuel in the different storage sites. So, we have been fighting for 10, 15 years in the Northwest Russia to achieve public information and achieving public participation. I see that there is the need for some fights in the Pacific Fleet area for much more attention and much more openness, especially from the Russian authorities, to give away information on the real situation to the public both in Russia and in the neighboring countries.

Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Adviser of the CSIS International Security Program

Mr. Yoshida raised the question of a perception gap and raised the issue how the Japanese public views these threat reduction programs; what is the value, what is the utility for Japan? Do we have any Japanese participants who want to respond to that? How are these programs perceived? Is the Japanese spending in these areas worthwhile, should it be expanded? Has the need for funding been explained to the Japanese public?

Mr. Takeshi Nakane, Deputy Director-General, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
The government of Japan needs to expend much more effort. Although non-proliferation of WMD is not an imminent issue for each and every Japanese citizen, but looking at the global community as a whole, this is indeed an important and critical issue. We need to urge the Japanese public to gain greater understanding of that.

In the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, education seems to be a major question. This is a highly urgent issue to be tackled with. Not only Japan but many other countries are trying to make efforts to promote education. And the Japanese Foreign Ministry is making efforts to deepen understandings among the public on the issues of non-proliferation as well as the government measures to cope with disarmament and non-proliferation. The seminar today is actually a part of such process, especially for the intellectual people in Japan who have participated here today to gain deeper understanding and to think through the Japanese programs. I believe this would be a very good opportunity for them.

The Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a participant as a cooperator of today's seminar, is, of course, making great effort for education and enlightenment of the people. I would very much hope that people in Japan could deepen the understanding of these problems. And I very much hope that mass media can transmit the relevant information to the public. The role to be played by the media would be increasingly important.

Mr. Viktor Akhunov, Head of Department, Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation

I would like to comment on the discussion about the need for additional financing to Russia or contributions from the Japanese taxpayers. When an intergovernmental agreement was concluded in 1993, Japan announced that it would provide \$100 million. On the other hand, there is only one project which has been realized so far. That is the project "Suzuran", which costs \$35 million. Within the framework of the Global Partnership, Japan declared that it would provide \$200 million, of which \$100 million would be used for dismantlement of nuclear submarines. However, only \$7 million has been expended so far. That is why I do not think that it is necessary to explain to the Japanese taxpayers the needs for additional financing. Right now, even the declared funds remain unexpended.

The second issue is the concern among the Japanese public about pollution of the Sea of Japan arising from the utilization of Russian nuclear submarines. As of today, Russia does not pollute the Sea of Japan. In 1994-1995, Russian-Japanese-South Korean surveys were conducted in the areas where submarines were buried and there were not even traces of radioactive pollution in these areas. At the same time, I would like to know whether the Japanese public knows about the amount of nuclear waste that is being dumped into the sea by the Japanese nuclear industry. For objectivity, we also hope to keep the Sea of Japan clean because it is close to Russia as well.

**Mr. Robert Kvile, Deputy Director General,
Security Policy Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Norway**

We have the same problem of explaining to the public in Norway. The question is, why could not the Russians do it themselves? The Russian economy is going very well because of the high price in oil and gas. I think the answer is simple. First, yes, they could do it themselves but, second, the new answer would be the urgency of the problem. First, it would go faster to solve the problem if we assisted.

Second, for us as a neighboring country—it is a good thing to be able to define priorities and you can do that by assisting them. Also, when you do projects together with the Russians, you can influence some of the standards by which projects are implemented. And, finally, it will be totally wrong to believe that the nuclear sector is the only problem the Russian Federation has to tackle. They have problems in the health sector and so on. The point that we are making in Norway is that it is in our own interest to assist the Russian Federation in dealing with the nuclear problems.

**Mr. Nils Bøhmer, Russian Program Director,
the Bellona Foundation**

The Norwegian authorities have been very strong in their support of cleaning up nuclear waste in Russia. One of the reasons is that we are sharing a border with Russia; the closest facility is only 45

kilometers from the Norwegian border. So, of course, it is in Norway's own interest that we help them to clean up. And Norwegian authorities have also been very helpful with gathering information and support for the international attention to this.

**Mr. Fumihiko Yoshida, Editorial Writer, Asahi
Shimbun**

On the oceanic pollution from Japanese nuclear power plants, the oceanic pollution, does it imply the discharges, effluents? The information on such incidences, two or three decades ago, up until then, there was much of the process which was quite secretive and non-disclosed. But more recently, I believe many of the companies, as well as authorities, are becoming more and more forthcoming in providing relevant information. So, the attitude seems to be changing. But what would constitute to be satisfactory will be different depending on who is looking at the situation.

Now, in order to fill in the perception gap, what can we do, what should we do? It is important to take opportunities such as the summit meetings and in other forum as well, which catch more attention of the public eyes, where people are focusing their attention on; for instance, U.S.-Russia or the Japan-Russia-U.S. summit meetings, perhaps the leaders of those countries could make public statements. When the public attention is large, the statements in common should be made.

**Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Director, DDCR, Institute
of World Economy and International Relations**

Concerning the question of openness, this street must have two-side traffic on both sides because Russia also wants to know how Japan cooperates with China in disposing of abandoned chemical weapons because it is very important in Japan. At the same time, Jilin province is not far from Russian Far East and rivers flow in the direction of Russian Far East. I think that the openness of that project from the Japanese as well as from Chinese sides will be very important to eliminate concern about, the possibility of pollution which would occur as a result of the implementation of the projects or facilities along the waterways, which reach Rus-

sian Far East.

Mr. Sergey Antipov, Russian Representative of the Governing Council, Deputy Director of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation

Here we hear the term "assistance to Russia", but I would like to suggest another interpretation. We do not help Russia but the humankind. We are trying to get rid of threat and protect the humankind from danger. Therefore, the answer to the question why Japanese or Norwegian taxpayers should spend their money is simple: it is to ensure one's own security. We are not discussing why the Cold War occurred and developed. Now the Cold War is over but we still have repercussions of the Cold War in our planet. It would be compared to the situation, in which we wake up after a big party in the morning and have to clear all the dirty plates that are left after the party. So, we should not ask each other why one side should help another side.

Next, I would like to comment on the question of whether it is safe to transport spent nuclear fuel to Mayak. Until now, we have unloaded spent nuclear fuel from 136 nuclear submarines in total and delivered it to Mayak, where it is reprocessed and converted into fuel for light water graphite reactors. The high radioactive wastes are all vitrified and stored at a special facility in Mayak. If we leave spent nuclear fuel in submarines, sooner or later, we will lose control over it, which can give rise to undesirable events.

And the last question about why we are lacking information on radioactive waste and environment in the Far East. In reality, it is not a political problem but rather a technical one because some facilities are in very bad state to the extent that we can not visit them and find out what they have in their storage facilities. In this respect, we need assistance for gaining information and then sharing with our neighbors and the public.

Mr. Takeshi Nakane, Deputy Director-General, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

First of all, in the presentation given by Mr. Antipov, the liability issue and the indemnification issue were mentioned. He pointed that there has been difficulties in coming to a resolution with the Japanese government and the project implementation has been delayed for one year. But in 1993, between Japan and Russia, the agreement was made, but the interpretation has not reached agreement. Perhaps a new agreement is necessary or a multilateral framework may be necessary. But without the will to resolve the problem, this issue will continue to be difficult. If we want to make another new agreement, it will take more than one year to formulate. Therefore, I do not necessarily think this is a practical solution.

On the dismantling of five nuclear submarines, although there are some difficulties between Japan and Russia in the terms of implementing the arrangement, I believe that understanding is being reached; therefore, in the near future the remaining issues should be resolved under the spirit of cooperation so that the five submarines can be dismantled. I certainly have high expectation of this.

Regarding the issue that was raised from the floor on the contamination the Sea of Japan, the intervention claimed that it has not been scientifically verified that it was caused by the Russian side. But in 1993, the low-level radioactive waste from the dismantling of nuclear submarines has actually dumped into the Sea of Japan. This was reported on the news and it has remained in the memories of many Japanese people. We were somewhat shocked by this. Even if the contamination is not proved by scientific data and even if you assert that there was no contamination of the Sea of Japan, the dumping of the radioactive materials into the Sea of Japan actually happened and was remembered by the public. That in itself is a major problem. I think there should be an appropriate understanding of such a problem of perception.

At any rate, on our part, the project under the Global Partnership is something that is not just for Russia to consider; it is in the national interest of Japan as well in terms of safety of Japan. That is

the reason why we are taking the initiative to cooperate in this effort. So, we do not feel that this issue is not important. The importance of this issue will be something that we would like to advocate strongly to related parties going forward. However, these issues are not akin to natural disasters. The country that caused the original problem has the primary responsibility to resolve this problem and there should be international cooperation rendered for this effort. I think this is the standpoint that is required. That is the point I wanted to emphasize.

**Mr. Yasuyoshi Komizo, Director of
International Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan**

I am responding to the Russian comments on the Japanese safety of the operation of the nuclear facility. Actually, it has been quite safe. It meets the international standard and actually I would just like to make sure that you can be assured that operation in Japan has been meeting international standard and has been safe. I just wanted to make sure that everybody does not misunderstand the situation in Japan. I do not comment to any other country's situation but I would like to make sure to confirm the safety of Japanese facilities.