

Panel Discussion (afternoon session)

Theme C

Challenge and Future of G8 Global Partnership

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This is the last session of today's symposium. The topic is "Challenge and Future of G8 Global Partnership." Re-emphasizing the meaning and significance of the Global Partnership is going to be the central theme. Global Partnership was launched to promote international coordination at the Kananaskis summit of 2002 in order to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ever since related projects covered mainly in former Soviet Union states, starting with dismantlement of nuclear submarines, destruction of chemical weapons, disposal of surplus plutonium and hiring of scientists; these are the four priority areas and we have been able to see visible results of these programs and some examples have been shown in the course of today's seminar of some successes of these programs. All of the participating countries in this program consider the proliferation of WMD as an urgent challenge of the international society and this is in the background of the success so far. There is no distinction between donor countries and recipient countries when it comes to

the political will to work toward the common goal of non-proliferation so they have been coordinating and cooperating with each other by gathering together their political wills.

In panel discussion in the morning, we have been able to reconfirm the importance of this Global Partnership of G8. In the afternoon session, examples about the dismantlement of nuclear submarines were introduced. Not only G8 nations, but other nations have also made positive participation of those efforts. Compared to Far East, there has been substantial progress in the North West of Russia. As for disposal of surplus plutonium, it has not been implemented in full scale today but in the very near future, some progress are expected vis _ vis Russia on the issue of liability. And there is going to be a review by Russia for the disposal of surplus plutonium so that as soon as possible the issue of disposition of plutonium can be resolved.

Of course, not all of the Global Partnership projects are going on very smoothly without any difficulties. There may be challenges going forward. Broadly speaking, they can be classified into short-term

challenges and mid- to long-term challenges.

Short-term challenges would include issues related to smooth implementation of programs within the current framework of Global Partnership. The recipient countries, such as Russia, should provide sufficient information and provide access to sites and also they would have to deal with liability and tax-exemption issues. Russia and Ukraine are covered as the recipients of this Global Partnership but the other former Soviet states could be covered by expanding the recipient countries.

Now, mid- to long-term challenges are the following. First of all, the countries that are going to be covered under this program would be including countries like Iraq, Libya and Albania. So countries other than former Soviet states could be covered under this program for the destruction of WMD as well as civilian use of knowledge and expertise of scientists. We would have to look at whether the Global Partnership methodology would be effective and useful for such countries as well. There are many initiatives for the denuclearization other than the Global Partnership. There should be coordination between the Global Partnership and other initiatives. The issue is how to go about coordinating with these other initiatives. Furthermore, as for the programs under the Global Partnership, in dismantlement of nuclear submarines and destruction of chemical weapons, although there are problems, there has been some progress. On the other hand, other issues such as disposal of surplus plutonium and employment of scientists; in these two areas we would have to look at how these programs could be accelerated so that is the remaining issue for us. Of course, we should not be looking at these challenges as burdens that have been imposed on us, but rather we should look at these challenges as an opportunity to make the Global Partnership more effective and useful.

In this session, from that positive and productive perspective, we would like to discuss various challenges for the future of the Global Partnership, how we can respond to these challenges in the future. So that is going to be the theme of our discussion

this session.

Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Advisor of the CSIS International Security Program

The Global Partnership was launched in June of 2002 with a lot of fanfare and very high expectations. But in the last year or so, some of the momentums and the sense of urgency have been lost and there is a risk that we will be returning to a pre-9/11 business as an usual approach. Let me offer a few suggestions for the purpose of reinvigoration of Global Partnership.

First, remaining obstacles to smooth implementation have to be cleared away. Russia needs to improve intragovernmental coordination and expedite the negotiation and ratification of agreements with partners. But Russia is not alone in bearing responsibility for removing the obstacles. Compromises must be reached between Russia and its partners that meet the legitimate needs of both sides. On the liability question, hopefully, agreement will soon be reached. On access to sensitive nuclear sites, compromise is likely to be more difficult. But modalities should be explored that protect truly sensitive information while giving donors confidence that their contributions are being used effectively and appropriately.

Second, all countries should increase their Global Partnership pledges. Twenty billion should be a floor, not a ceiling. Japan should be a leader in this regard. There is no reason why Japan should be last among the G8 countries and by a considerable margin. And as obstacles are reduced and eliminated, obstacles such as bureaucratic problems, access and liability, as these obstacles are removed, the case for increasing the Japanese pledge should become compelling.

Third, the Global Partnership should make the transition from an assistance program to a true partnership. With Russia playing a more central role in designing and coordinating projects, assuming a larger share of the financial burden and preparing itself to make threat reduction activities self-sus-

taining as assistance is eventually phased out.

Fourth, greater attention should be given to the Global Partnership projects that are more directly related to countering the terrorist threat. Submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons elimination are worthy activities; they ought to continue to be pursued, but the Global Partnership partners, other than the United States, can also play a role in securing nuclear materials and biological agents. For example, the GP members can participate in the U.S.-Russia IAEA Global Threat Reduction Initiative to remove potentially vulnerable, highly enriched uranium fuels from research reactor sites throughout the world.

Fifth, and finally, the Global Partnership should be made more global. Russia, of course, remains the highest priority followed by another states of the former Soviet Union. But with additional resources, the Global Partnership can deal with threats outside the former Soviet Union as well. Already as just mentioned, threat reduction activities are taking place in Iraq, Libya, Albania and elsewhere. And one can imagine circumstances in which threat reduction programs might be applicable in North Korea and maybe that is a subject we can come back to in our discussion and we should begin planning for such contingencies now.

In year 2006, Russia takes over the chairmanship of the G8 and the annual summit of G8 will be held in Russia. I am sure that the government of Russia wants that summit to be a success and to give another boost to the Global Partnership but if the Russia summit is to be an important milestone in the Global Partnership, it is essential that we begin taking some of the steps I have outlined very soon. Thank you.

Mr. Tom Conner, Counselor, Australian Embassy in Tokyo

If you consider Australia's case, it might not seem to be a program which would have a direct relationship to our national interests. In fact, as a country which in recent years has been the target of ter-

rorist attacks, we are very, very conscious of the fact that any leakage of weapons or material, materials of mass destruction, into the hands of terrorists would constitute a very grave threat to the international community as a whole and, of course, to Australia as a part of the international community.

We are one of several countries whose participation in the Global Partnership as non-G8 countries that was announced at the Sea Island Summit in 2004. Although our financial commitment is quite small in comparison to some of the other countries, we have no doubt that the Global Partnership is a valuable and timely contribution to international efforts to ensure that terrorists do not gain access to weapons of mass destruction.

Having made the decision to join the Global Partnership, we had several considerations in mind in choosing where we were going to make our contribution. Firstly, as a small contributor, we were aware of the fact that it was probably not of great value for us to establish an independent relationship with Russia and to look at developing a full-blown program of our own; it is quite a small amount of money. Therefore, we believed that the greater value would arise from piggybacking onto, that is, attaching ourselves onto an existing the G8 Global Partnership activity and thereby, in effect, stretching our money because we would be able to take account of the fact that administrative and other arrangements were already in place for that activity.

Also, looking around at the many valuable and worthwhile programs that are a part of the G8 Global Partnership, in the end we decided to approach Japan and Russia to see if we could participate in their particular program involving submarine dismantlement for several reasons. Firstly, because we see, of course, the dismantlement of those submarines as a valuable contribution to nuclear security in our Asian-Pacific region and that was quite an important factor in our government's decision. Being a Pacific country, we were attracted to the notion of taking part in an activity that was going to happen here in the Pacific.

And, secondly, apart from the nuclear security related aspect of it, we were also conscious of the environmental aspect of the Global Partnership program. Again, as a Pacific country, we were struck by the notion that having these hulks rusting in the Pacific Ocean in Russia was not a good thing environmentally and so this was also a factor which swayed us. We, therefore, decided around about this time last year to make our contribution. I have to say that one of the practical considerations that faced us at that time was that, towards the end of our financial year, while we had secured funds for that financial year we needed to get quick agreement from both Russia and Japan in order to make sure that the funds could be expended and they were not going to be taken back by a Ministry of Finance.

And perhaps one of the factors was that Russians and Japanese, just as much as Australians, dislike being given trouble by the Ministry of Finance, but I have to say that we had magnificent cooperation from both the Japanese and Russian sides and were able to complete our procedures in a very quick fashion.

In relation to the program as a whole and its future, we would agree with other participants that there needs to be careful consideration given to the relationship between the Global Partnership and other complementary activities outside the scope of the partnership and need to place the Global Partnership in that broader context. For our part, Australia is being involved in several activities in the region, including the conference which many countries here attended last year in Sydney in November on nuclear safeguards and the security, which focused on the increased threat of nuclear terrorism and the steps that could be taken to enhance nuclear safeguards and security in the region.

We have also been cooperating with the IAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy to improve security and regulation of vulnerable of radioactive sources in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. And, of course, with many other countries represented here, we are active in the promotion of encouraging countries

to put in place export controls and also in meeting the requirements of the IAEA additional protocol.

The partnership has had many successes in securing donor funding, in broadening the scope of the partnership to include countries of the former Soviet Union and also in completing a number of projects on time and to cost. And we believe that the recent steps that Russia and other G8 partners have taken to improve their working relationships are very much helping to provide the strong operational framework that is needed to further develop the partnership. We are particularly grateful for the intention expressed by the United Kingdom to focus on turning pledges into process during progress on issues during its chairing of the Global Partnership. Nevertheless, there are many areas in Russia, many projects we would agree are quite frustrating and there are legal and other hurdles which we have heard of today which remain. We would hope that the experience we have had in joining the Global Partnership would serve both as an example to other countries who are considering taking part and also would help to assist the participants in the Global Partnership to develop ways in which to address some of the difficulties. We think it is very important, both for recipient countries and for the larger donor countries, to bear in mind that the project arrangements that they are establishing right now could have the potential both to attract more countries like ourselves to participate in the partnership and to frighten off some countries as well if they don't turn out too well. So we would encourage both the donors and the recipient countries to pay attention to that aspect of things.

I listen to the presentations today, I just jotted down a couple of points which struck me as issues which have been features and considerations in our participation in the Global Partnership. We would agree that the issues of information and access are very important for accountability purposes and we, as a small donor, will be just as accountable to our public and to our Parliament as the large donors and as the recipient countries and we, likewise, will be faced with those kind of issues. And I agree with the points that were made earlier that things like

access are important, also for public diplomacy aspects of this exercise because if we are able to educate our publics and show them that money that they have provided is being put to good use, then that is only going to encourage the further commitment of funds to the Global Partnership long-term.

And, secondly, the other issue I would like to talk about is speed or timelines in pushing through with some of the projects that have been committed to but which have yet to be brought into reality. One of the issues is to remind us all that in order to make sure that the partnership reaches its full potential, we need to be accelerating these projects as if our lives depend on them because, in fact, they do. And in order to reduce some of the delays that have been associated with getting some of the projects underway, we think it would be valuable, again as a smaller participant in the process, if G8 countries would consider, for example, developing harmonized arrangements on issues such as liability and site access, or even a generic kind of legal arrangement for each of the categories of projects which take place under the partnership so that the whole process can be speeded up. When countries, such as ourselves, are going to come and join in some of the worthwhile projects that are being run, we can be confident that these things are going to take place in a timely fashion.

**Mr. Jong Kwon Youn, Deputy Director,
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic
of Korea**

I would like to make three points. First, I would like to briefly explain Korea's participation on the GP process and, number two, I would like to address two issues that has given challenges. One is the expansion of membership and the second point is better coordination, especially of non-G8 participants to the GP.

First of all, it was not until last year that Korea joined the G8 Global Partnership, our participation started as early as 1998 by dispatching our scientists and

making financial contributions to the ISTC in Moscow. I think we are doing this for several reasons, but the most important thing is that we are serious in non-proliferation policy in general. We are a member to all major export controls and also we have gone through all the domestic legal processes to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

It has been only three years since the beginning, and the GP is currently in a transitional phase for lots of reasons. I think the first issue that we need to talk about is the expansion of membership. The interesting point in the Global Partnership is that the selection of potential recipients is based upon the potential threat that they might cause, regardless of their willingness to do so. It is also voluntary to become a donor state. So, one of the reasons that G8 countries, in my view, started out on pretty active outreach is to resolve this problem of further funding but less pledges. But we really need to take balance between the donor states and recipient states, and in order to do so, we probably have to share the threat perception that comes from proliferation among potential participants, including both donors and recipients. And how do you do this? More active outreach should be made, both by G8 countries and non-G8 countries. That is probably the only solution at this moment.

And, secondly, this means that, let us say, a new state is joining the Global Partnership. It can reflect more specific concerns of its own as a new participant. It is not like just sharing the bills of the product that you might or might not want. I think every participant both new and old share this view.

From a non-G8 country point of view, just like ourselves, we do feel much of an information gap between the G8 countries and the non-G8 countries. I will not say it is so serious that it actually hinders much of our contribution. If there were more help both from Russia and other countries to non-G8 countries in receiving information about the current state of project, how it is going and how the fundings are distributed, then it would be much more facilitating.

Proliferation concerns also change over time and in a regional context they are pretty much interested if under the condition if the DPRK, North Korea dismantles its nuclear programs. I think they could be considered as a prospect recipient. I know this is futuristic and I am not really sure exactly when that would happen, but I would see that we would have much contingency.

Dr. Alan Heyes, Deputy Director, International Nuclear Policy & Programmes, Department of Trade and Industry, the UK

The theme for the U.K. presidency is Pleasures Into Progress. We choose this theme for a very good reason. We believe the best way to demonstrate success to our key stakeholders, to the people providing the money, the U.K. taxpayers is to demonstrate that we are having a lot of success in setting up the project since Kananaskis. We hope to publish as part of the documents produced at the Gleneagles Summit next month some information which sets out the progress on projects that has been achieved by the Global Partnership countries, not just the G8 countries, but countries like Norway, Sweden, et cetera, which were actually doing projects on the ground very successfully. So I think that is one of the key. If I was asked to say what is the most important theme in terms of the challenges, it would be to demonstrate that we have been given this quite substantial sum of taxpayer's money to spend by a number of countries and we are actually achieving successful results on the ground, because that is the only way to guarantee if we want to stand a chance of getting further funds to tackle this substantial proliferation security and safety, environmental challenge we face, not just in the Russia but around the world.

One of the key things to mention is to maintain a momentum in the Global Partnership program. At every G8 summit, there are new initiatives raised, Prime Ministers and Presidents are very keen to launch new initiatives with large sums of money attached. The Global Partnership was launched three years ago and it becomes ever difficult to maintain the profile of the program. But we have to

do that if we want to stand a chance of delivering the objectives of this program by 2012, so that is probably the most important challenge, maintaining momentum in the program and its profile with all our key stakeholders.

In terms of the main points I put in the paper for discussion and comments at the working group meeting recently, I will run through these in terms of what the challenges we were discussed and there was general consensus on in terms of the implementation challenges. And these are very much practical challenges and I attach a lot of importance to this because it is my job to deliver a program on behalf of the U.K. so I have a personal commitment to ensure that we try and meet some of these challenges.

The first thing is that we are talking about a long term program; whether it goes on beyond 2012 is anybody's guess but clearly there is a lot of work to do, even beyond 2012. Long term planning is important, particularly for more complex projects, like Andreeva Bay, some of the nuclear security priorities, and chemical weapons destruction. We are talking here about projects which do not just last a few months or a like, like submarine dismantlement projects, which go on for a number of years or decades, in fact.

And there is clearly an importance that the Russian Federation will develop and share with donors its own plan, programs and priorities, including its own planned financial commitment. There is also a requirement, a commitment really on donor countries, to make it clear how they intend to plan to meet their commitment and when their funding will become available because the Russian Federation has to plan ahead and they need to understand what funding will become available for these long term strategic projects, whether it is plutonium disposition, Andreeva Bay or nuclear security projects.

Secondly, now that we have got a number of donor countries committed to funding the Global Partnership projects, we need to ensure we do not waste resources in competition for the sexiest projects

with consequent loss of financial resources to beneficiary countries, not just the Russian Federation, as well as wasted time and effort for donors. And there has been one or two examples recently where donors have been in competition and where time has been lost in terms of negotiating projects with the Russian Federation. It is important, obviously, to establish effective international coordination groups where we have complicated projects like Andreeva Bay, some of the chemical weapon projects like Shchuch'ye where a number of donor countries or organizations like the European Union are involved in. Good models here are the Andreeva Bay coordination group, which involve Norway, U.K., Sweden, Italy and the European Bank. And if the Shchuch'ye coordination working group, the chemical weapons destruction at Shchuch'ye involves the U.S., Russia, U.K. and Canada.

They certainly are seen by those involved as a very good way of making everybody knows what is going to happen, the problems and challenges and we avoid duplication of efforts, although these may not be appropriate things for all projects.

The other key thing is that coordination, which means a lot of things, would be greatly improved if details of proposed projects being negotiated or planned are also shared among Global Partnership countries. We have lots of information about projects underway or completed. But there is less information about details of projects being discussed with the Russian Federation and other beneficiary countries. This information is often vital to make sure we do not waste effort and we do not duplicate projects on the ground. Again, there have been one or two examples where early warning of proposals being discussed between country X with the Russian Federation or another FSU country would have been valuable to provide to another donor country, which may have reduced cost and made the project better. So that is important.

Now, some pledges have still not led to any significant commitments; we have heard some examples today, often for very good reasons, as I explained

in my presentation. They can take a long time to set up complicated projects which have substantial amount of risk and safety issues attached where countries like Australia mentioned do not wish to set up their own program management infrastructure, it is being fairly well proven over the past couple of years that piggybacking has worked very well and is a good way of delivering successful projects on the ground with a number of countries putting money into the project. I would certainly recommend that for getting projects off the ground with the number of donor countries in the future. We need to do more to share project information, lessons learned and best practices particularly between all the good work that has been done in North West Russia. I am sure a lot of this information would be very valuable to share with the Japanese colleagues or other donor countries planning to do work in the Far East. This all helps reduce risk and enhance confidence. Reducing risk and increasing confidence will enable projects to get off the ground much quicker.

It has also taken significant time, six months or more, to negotiate for fairly simple changes to existing implementing agreements. For the U.K., for example, it took six months, just to add a few words into our agreement so that we could do nuclear security and safety projects. This is obviously out of the responsibility of Rosatom because a number of government departments in the Russian Federation were involved. We need to find ways of streamlining some of the bureaucracy where, on the face of it, there is no need to take six months to change a few words in an agreement.

Also, internal processes within donor countries can also delay projects significantly. This is something I am particularly concerned about for future complicated projects where they are on a critical path for delivery. Say we are doing spent nuclear fuel movement at Andreeva Bay. We would not be able to start the project until we are sure that there is a radioactive waste material plant available to deal with the waste, which another donor country may be involved in. So, there is an interaction between separate projects and separate donors which may

slow the projects down. All that strategic planning needs to be addressed at an early stage by all the donors and the Russian Federation.

One or two people have mentioned problems of taxation and access. We have not had too much problem with access to sites. We very much respect that there are security issues associated with some of the sites; you have to plan around that. Again, long-term planning, you can resolve most of these issues. In terms of some of the taxation issues, I suspect it is as much of both our project people and individual organizations in Russia, not being particularly familiar with some of the taxation rules. That is an educational communication process we need to work on. To that end, we are hosting a taxation seminar in Moscow in a few weeks' time to make sure that all the U.K. players are up to date with how you deal with taxation issues. And we have learned again from some of our colleagues in the U.S. government of how we deal with some of these taxation issues.

Particularly important for somebody who works at a government department, keeping all our stakeholders informed and happy is a priority of my team. Particularly since our ministers are very keen on it, this is one reason why we produce and are encouraging the Global Partnership countries to produce annual reports of what they are doing. Norway recently produced a very good report to that end and also Germany has produced one last year.

Finally, we always need to keep an eye in the future about changing priorities. What happens if North Korea suddenly wants to sort out its own materials and wants help from other countries? There is an issue there, how we address and how we respond quickly to changing priorities. We need to spend more time thinking about that as part of the Global Partnership working group.

I finished off as I started. It is important that we demonstrate that we are being successful in this important endeavor. The start of the Kananaskis project was only three years ago and we have achieved a lot in the last three years. A lot of coun-

tries are doing a lot of good work in the Russian Federation and other countries and we need to build upon that success if we want to guarantee that we get all the pledged money and if there is any chance of getting further funding from other donors. Other donors will not join us unless we can demonstrate this is a worthwhile endeavor and is delivering successful projects on the ground. Thank you.

Q&A

Mr. Holger Schmidt, Project Leader, Projektleitung Atom-U-Boot-Entsorgung, Energiewerke Nord GmbH

I want to add some thoughts to the challenge and future of the G8 Global Partnership program. Acting in time and money and presenting the thoughts of our work on-site is the best we can do to convince the public that we are going the right way. We are ready to extend to prolonged existent programs on the German side. We will tackle the storage of contaminated service ships or parts of them, the creation of a treatment center for volume minimization of radioactive waste and to find the solution for project 901. I wish that the political active people will solve the frame condition for these following up projects just in that time we need for the paperwork. That is all.

Mr. Henry Leval, Counselor (Political), Embassy of France in Tokyo

I want to add a few comments and insist that my country buys the argument that the Global Partnership has to turn into something more cooperative, something with more partnership in it with Russia, and also that we have to cope more with the possible threat of terrorism within the G8 Global Partnership. My country completely buys this idea and that is why, during our presidency, we insisted on including the biological field completely. It is obvious that biological field is one where terrorism can occur and we concentrated nowadays on a few of our financial resources on biological cooperation within the G8 Global Partnership but it is not the less fruitful of our cooperation with Russia. Thank you.

**Mr. Viktor Akhunov, Head of Department,
Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian
Federation**

I listened with great attention to the perspectives of development of the Global Partnership programs and I would like to characterize some points. We should all understand that the main direction of the Global Partnership was defined at the Kananaskis Summit, during the G8 summit. As for the partnership with Russia, the Russian Federation President Putin already defined the priorities. At present, not all G8 countries are actively cooperating within the framework of the G8 Global Partnership.

We have a perfect type of cooperation with Germany. Then, we have good working relationships with the U.K. When it comes to France, it deals mainly with biological weapons, but we have not started any cooperation on nuclear submarines yet. Let us start with things that were declared by your president during the summit in Kananaskis and then move to define other directions of cooperation.

As for a reference by the representative of the Republic of Korea to North Korea and ISTC, it seems that he might not get full understanding of what the Global Partnership is. If the Republic of Korea wants to join the Global Partnership, it can do that quite easily, just by sending an official representative to the G8 meeting or working group. In this regard, I can refer to Norway as a good example. In 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway sent us an official letter with the intention to participate the Global Partnership. And now, Norway as well as Sweden is an official member of the Global Partnership program. If we speak about the perspectives, I think we should speak realistically about the concrete steps we have to take and we should not just dream about something in the future.

I also listened carefully to the Japanese representatives. They said that Australia is a very good partner for them and Korea also a potential partner, but for what? Russia is also their partner. Australia allocated funds for the dismantlement of submarines but all these funds are in Japan for a whole year. Do we see any progress?

Lastly, I think that commitments that we have made earlier should be fulfilled in a coordinated manner.

**Mr. Alexander Bulychev, Project Manager,
Center for Policy Studies in Russia**

A number of speakers today spoke of how we can make the Global Partnership more effective and more efficient and a number of speakers mentioned that it is very important to raise public awareness and public concern. That is why I believe such seminars as we are having here for example are very important because they give us an opportunity to bring together not only diplomats and policymakers but also practitioners and representatives of civil society and that is why I respect the delegates.

**Dr. Alexander Pilkaev, Director, DDCR, Institute
of World Economy and International Relations**

I would like to follow on what Dr. Heyes said earlier. He expressed concern that in time when existing commitment have not been completed, we might go into new, very expensive programs which could further complicate the whole situation. And my observation and maybe question to the panel is: do you not think that returning back to discussing plutonium disposition agreement also create problems? We have unfinished business in the area of chemical weapons elimination, we have unfinished business in nuclear submarines, we have a problem in accelerating/enhancing security measures on stocks of highly-enriched uranium which many experts think could be used by terrorists much easier than plutonium, for instance. We have unsolved problems for creating alternative places for WMD. And this would cost billions and billions of dollars, maybe dozens of billions of dollars.

But now we are talking about potentially entering into a very expensive program of disposing of plutonium. It would require another billions and billions of dollars because it involves not only research on developing new reactors but also considerable investment into nuclear energy based on alternative nuclear reactors. It, again, is a very expensive adventure. The question is on would we not to the situation of new money, that money that has been promised in Kananaskis would go into this pluto-

mium disposition and it would come into conflict with spending for the priorities that we discussed here earlier today? Thank you.

**Mr. Robert Kvile, Deputy Director General,
Security Policy Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Norway**

I would like to add a few words to the problem of lack of progress in G8 Global Partnership. It has been pointed out that the G8 countries have so far not reached the goal of raising 20 billion U.S. dollars. I do not think that is the problem, at least not for the time being. The problem is not necessarily lack of funds, but there has also been—and I think this is more important—a focus on certain practical obstacles. There has been mentioning of a lack or unsatisfactory access to documentation or access to project sites. Our experience is that for all practical purposes, these practical obstacles are removed.

My point is that we should not forget the practical obstacles created by donor countries themselves. Here you have, for example, very cumbersome, very slow decision making progresses for freeing funds. And you also have a problem that not all donor countries fully understand how much time you have to use on establishing the project organization you need for running smoothly projects in Russia.

I can give you an example. In the Foreign Ministry, I have only three desk officers for running our 20 million U.S. dollar program annually but I am supported by the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, a huge organization that gives me all technical and expertise advise I need for my political decision making and in the other end of it, I have three organizations that are running on the ground the projects. These are organizations that have been working in Russia for many years. They have Russian employees, some of them, some of them speak Russian. My point is, to come where we are today, able to run quite effectively a project, it has taken us 10 years.

Therefore, I think—this is my final point—Australia has made a very wise decision on piggybacking on

another country. This is something that should be done more. By the way, we are piggy on each other's back, Norway and U.K., in the Andreeva Bay, on Nerpa and chemical weapons destruction as well and France will piggyback together with Norway on the strontium battery business this summer. Same for France and Canada.

**Dr. Michael Guhin, Ambassador, U.S. Fissile
Material Negotiator, U.S. Department of State**

I would like to make one comment about plutonium disposition and whether or not money might be put elsewhere. I would make a general comment here. It does raise a question of priorities and having spent decades in this business, there is always a question of priorities, but one has to be very careful, it seems to me, that you cannot ignore one problem by focusing on things that might appear to be more in the near term. Plutonium disposition is a long term project; it is going for a decade or two. When more material becomes available, more decades would be needed to get this plutonium into spent fuel. I think it is incumbent on us to make sure that we do not ignore this problem because if we ignore it, then it will become a problem of choice for some.

The second thing, from a political sense, I would have to take a point that even if one were to say that plutonium disposition would not go forward, that does not mean that any of those funds would ever become available for anything else. This is the nature of programming and budgeting and, therefore, I think there is certainly—there needs to be enough political will to address each and every one of these problems and that none of these problems can be put under the rug with the hope that someday it might go away.

**Mr. Jong Kwon Youn, Deputy Director,
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic
of Korea**

First of all, I am happy to respond to the Russian participant that we already secured our funds for this year and when you are selecting the project for the joint, I will duly reflect your comments.

And, number two, we are already participating in the working group meetings but, however, for some strange reasons, we have not heard from the G8 side at this time so that has caused a little communication problem but I think the problem will deal with itself in the next time, in our next meeting.

Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Advisor of the CSIS International Security Program

I will use the time just to say something about priorities, which is an important and complicated issue. I have sometimes heard the argument, often by Russian colleagues, that let us not spread ourselves too thin, let us focus on a few main tasks and accomplish those tasks. So, let us work on the submarine dismantlement problem and the chemical weapon elimination problem until we have solved that and then we can move on to other things.

I understand the rationale for that but I think there is a stronger case to be made for focusing on the most urgent things and I think that we should have some kind of a threat based sense of priorities and if we really had a threat based sense of priorities, we would look to nuclear security and biosecurity as our highest priorities. There are some things in the near term that can be done, whether it is the global threat reduction initiative that is going with HEU fuels that are scattered around the world or the more material protection control and accountability work in Russia where I think is a lot of urgency attached to that or the securing potentially dangerous pathogen collections around the world. Those are the very highest priorities that deserve our attention.

But at the same time, you have very important long term projects, like plutonium disposition. You cannot put those off forever because they are going to take a long time. Part of the answer here is that we need more resources. Of course, there are never going to be enough resources to do all of these things; we are always going to have to make trade offs but if we really treated the 20 billion as a floor, and not a ceiling, it would make the priority question a lot easier and I think that we need to do that.

One of the benefits, I think, of having a conference here in Tokyo is that it is one of the first big Global Partnership activities held in East Asia; I think it is very important to demonstrate that the Global Partnership really is global and that what is happening in North East Asia is very relevant to the security of the world and it is very good to have a South Korean colleague and our Australian colleague here at the table. It is increasingly important that threat reduction activities begin to focus on this part of the world and we should begin to think about application of a Nunn-Lugar type Global Partnership threat reduction programs in North Korea. You know, one can only imagine a small number of contingencies in which that is relevant. Either North Korea agrees to eliminate its nuclear program as an overall resolution and prepare to cooperate in reducing some of its weapons of mass destruction infrastructure; that is one contingency. Another is if some day North Korea simply crumbles, and then, what do you do with all of these weapons of mass destruction, personnel and facilities and inventories that we presume are scattered around the country? I think then there would be an urgent need for cooperation threat reduction type activities there. And it is time we started to plan.

A lot of discussion today have revolved around public opinion and demonstrating to taxpayers that they are getting their money's worth out of these programs and that is another reason why I am very pleased that we have had this meeting here in Tokyo. I think it is important for the Japanese public to gain a better appreciation of what is at stake for Japan in these programs that the government of Japan is supporting, and I, therefore, hope that the press who are represented here will provide the Japanese public a good account of what we have done here today so that hopefully further support can be built for Japanese contributions to this program.

Mr. Tom Conner, Counselor, Australian Embassy in Tokyo

One point that I would like to stress is that we have found our participation valuable. We believe it is the right thing to do and we believe we are making

a good contribution.

I guess the good thing about piggybacking on other people's program is that the structure is in place, activities are in place and you do not have to do too much of your own spade work to get things underway. The disadvantage, of course, is that you are reliant on the main actors and the main plays to keep things moving along and not in relation to our own one.

We hope that our participation will serve as an example for other countries, particularly those in the Asian Pacific region but perhaps more broadly and encourage them to get involved in the partnership programs. We think that if there can be more cooperation between the G8 countries, both the recipients and the donors, in terms of working out arrangements that can be applied more broadly and that will be applied consistently, it will encourage countries like ourselves, to participate because we will be confident that our money will be spent in a timely fashion and that things will go smoothly. So if you are able to achieve this kind of thing by more harmonization of the way arrangements are done for various partnership programs, you will have an increase in non-G8 participation, both in terms of number of countries and, hopefully, in terms of amount of money being pledged, which can only be good.

Dr. Alan Heyes, Deputy Director, International Nuclear Policy & Programmes, Department of Trade and Industry, the UK

I think presidents and prime ministers are still content that the four Kananaskis principles: chemical weapons destruction, plutonium disposition, submarine dismantlement and redirection of scientists are still top of the agenda. And the U.K. will do all that it can in order to make sure that we deliver in those four key areas. But we are also trying to see if we can try to help towards reducing threats from other issues. We are working with the U.S. and Canada to improve the nuclear security of some sites in Russia and other former Soviet Union countries and these are still priorities for us, so that must be the message back home, we are committed to

plutonium disposition, we will do all we can to working with the U.S. to deliver that program.

The U.K. is very happy to share its experience with all Global Partnership countries, and that it is not just an offer during our presidency year; it is open on the table after the next few years. An example of the sort of things we can offer: we hosted last year a risk management workshop under the auspices of the contact expert group, which I chaired, and we had some participation from Japan at that workshop and I understand they got a lot of benefit and value out of that sort of work and we will do what we can to host similar workshops to reduce risk and encourage projects to get off the ground as quickly as possible in the future.

Mr. Sergey Antipov, Deputy Director, Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation

In today's seminar, I have a kind of contradictory feelings. On one side, I am greatly satisfied that we have examined very important programs of the Global Partnership, of expanding the Global Partnership in the Far East area. Today, we heard many presentations on how we try to solve problems about not dispersing of nuclear weapons to the terrorists or other groups. So, we can see so many countries participating in our conference and I think it reflects their great interest in this matter.

But on the other side, maybe it sounds naive, but I was expecting more progress in practical matters. Of course, it doesn't mean that I expect a kind of proposal that we divide our finance into halves between the Far East and the North West. But I never heard any specific proposals how we should settle this situation in the Far East, neither from the European side, nor from the Asian side. It seemed me that there were many common political declarations and there was also a discussion, which, so to speak, confused two main directions of the Global Partnership: submarine utilizations and chemical weapon destruction.

We have to wait a while before what we have discussed today finally reaches our governments, organizations and the public. But at the same time, I

think this meeting was not useless in terms of additional, new information for each other.

We don't need to invent a new type of vehicle, we should ride a ready-made bicycle, pedal hard and move forward. There are many countries which have a great experience in this area and I think we should make good use of this experience. I hope that Australian and Japanese friends will not be angry, but for example, if Australia had given its money to Canada, Canada would have used this money already. But in fact, we haven't been able to settle some questions with the Japanese side, so the money has been frozen until now. I think what I said today will impose on us additional obligation and I am sure that we will be able to resolve these problems together.

Mr. Takeshi Nakane, Deputy Director-General, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

In the present international circumstances, how to deal with the weapons of mass destruction, is indeed an urgent issue. Japan has been promoting cooperation with other countries in many fields. The G8 Global Partnership is very important as a great model for the international effort and cooperation. In this regard, I believe the audience who has participated in this seminar could understand why we are trying to tackle this issue and in what areas we need to cultivate international collaboration to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, through this seminar, many challenges of the G8 Global Partnership were identified. We need to address the issues of the access to project sites and the necessary information, and also to deal with the question of tax exemption and indemnification. Japan and Russia have been working together to start with the next projects of dismantlement of the nuclear submarines as quickly as possible.

We should not try to criticize each other. We should not try to finger point at each other; As the phrase, "Global Partnership", shows, we need to work in

concert, work in a collaborative manner. Just looking at the past six months, almost once every month, we have visited Russia and tried to work out the problems. As you can see, with such a process and experience, Japan is not trying delay solving these problems. Rather than that, we are actually trying to work hard, very sincerely, in good faith to see progress for all of these matters.

The G8 Global Partnership should be expanded to countries other than the G8 members. In this sense, the financial contribution from Australia is highly appreciated. The funds from Australia have not been paid to Japan but it has been paid to the Japan-Russia Committee for Cooperation on Reducing Nuclear Weapons and for the next projects for the dismantlement of nuclear submarines to go ahead, the Australian should be involved in the planning so that their funds could be put to effective use.

As to the increase of funding to promote the projects under the G8 Global Partnership, the challenge ahead is many obstacles being encountered during the implementation stage rather than the financing issue. In the case of Japan, our support and cooperation, vis à vis the de-nuclearization in Russia, only one-fourth of our pledged amount has been dispersed. The very first disbursement was back in 1993; it has been more than 10 years and that is the extent that we have gone as far.

We also need to gain the understanding of the taxpayers. We need to do more in order to see progress for the G8 Global Partnership, we very much would like to make our own contribution and for the dismantling of the nuclear submarines, I very much hope that as quickly as possible, we will be able to come to agreement with Russia.

As for the disposition of the surplus plutonium, many problems should be solved as early as possible so that we will be able to see the progress and the funds provided by Japan could be put to good use for the implementation. An importance and relevance of the G8 Global Partnership should be understood better by the Japanese public; I very much hope that such an atmosphere and environ-

ment will be created in Japan.

At today's seminar, we realised that many countries have been involved in dismantling nuclear submarines especially in North West Russia. We have received relevant information and experiences of the Northwestern part of Russia as we have been participating in the working group sessions of Experts' Meetings as observers. Moreover, we, the people concerned, recognized that non-G8 countries, such as Norway, have been eagerly involved in the dismantling of nuclear submarines. I strongly hope that the promotion of sharing information makes proceed smoothly the projects of the dismantling of nuclear submarines in the Far East Russia as the same in the Northwest. Projects under G8 Global Partnership are open to not only G8 countries, but also other countries. It is important that the number of participants to the G8 Global Partnership increase by further exchange of views with each other.

The cooperation such as G8 Global Partnership, perhaps two decades ago was never conceivable, never even dreamt of. The spirit of the partnership should be promoted further; that would be crucial for our cooperation. This is not a question relevant only for Russia but also for Japan as well. In that sense, we would like to actively be involved in the process going forward.